NEW TIMES

Hostages: crime and punishment

July 30 – August 5, 1991

30

A SOVIET WEEKLY OF WORLD AFFAIRS

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

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A SOVIET WEEKLY
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

NEW TIMES

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

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From our mailbag

■ Irina Lagunina's article *The first leakage* was published in *New Times* No. 27 (July 1991). Stating what she thought was the reason for information leaks from the closed session of the Supreme Soviet and who she thought publicized the content of the head of the KGB's statement, the above writer infers the participation of the KGB in the publication in the media of confidential information.

Lagunina first tells of the floating "rumours that the KGB Public Relations Department itself gave the material to a Leningrad journalist," whereupon she corroborates her "argument" with the radio station *Moscow's Echo* and the Russian TV programme *Vesti's* confirmation of the rumours. Then, without the confirmation of any other source of information, she claims: "The KGB acquaints a journalist with the speech of its chairman" and "the KGB breaks the ethics and procedures of the country's highest legislative body."

Leaving on the writer's conscience all of the subsequent deductions, inferences, and versions of these claims, we officially declare that neither the KGB nor the Public Relations Department gave the media any data on the closed session of the Supreme Soviet.

In accordance with Article 26 of the Law of the USSR on the Mass Media, we ask that our refutation be published in the pages of *New Times*.

A.N. Karbainov,
head of the KGB
Public Relations Department

■ Did Ionin's article *What's nice about Famusof?* (No. 12/91, Russ. ed.) disturb you? I was delighted – it's too bad that there are few of such articles in *NT*. I share the alarm of the good writer, whom I so respect. I am afraid that since his material has surprised you, you will push him back to the last pages, while the early pages will forever be taken by Soloveichik and Ivanova.

I remember what a wonderful impression Soloveichik made with his articles on pedagogical subjects. What, everything has already been resolved in this area? Why did the writer, who himself admitted that he is no economist, feel the need to set out on an analysis of the economic situation and speak of it with such aplomb? Why break down an open door, when all these problems have already been endlessly discussed, and the Party had already rejected all that the writer rejected? Criticizing the Communist Party, lauding the democrats, can you really not see that we're just trading a dictator for one of another colour? But this one is just as cruel, just as destructive as any other.

Pray tell me, what was the meaning of Tatiana Ivanova's article *High Degree* (No.12, 1991, Russ. ed.)? A young

I am a Russian nationalist

■ Politically, I am a national democrat. I came to them by way of the Popular Front, therefore I know the democrats from the inside. Full-blooded Russians won't join them. This is beyond doubt, if only because for the majority of my countrymen the October takeover was a tragedy, not a road to a "brighter future." My father's side of the family has Leningrad proletarian roots, and my mother's side is peasant. My ancestors, like all Russian people, were dragged by the puss through a washboard, and only soap scum was left on their faces. The Bolsheviks ruined the physiognomy of the Russian people, but their souls remained pure. You fight for the return to private business. You see, that has to have the support of all of the people. Obviously, you and I have different interpretations of "the people." For you, they are the faceless masses: the Soviet people. But for me, they are the Russian people.

I am a nationalist. Alas, Russian nationalism is the people's answer to the politics of national genocide. Not only Russians responded to the introduction of Marxism in this way. The danger is not that Russian men may take up their axes in defense of their peace and quiet. It's that the democrats, upon coming to power, will continue Bolshevik politics, directed toward the artificial assimilation of the peoples of the USSR into a single Soviet nationality. This isn't russification, as the non-Russian republics claim. This is the annihilation of all the peoples of the USSR. Including the Russians. The democrats' resistance to the national movement of the most prominent people of the Soviet Union begets only fascism. This is how it happened in Germany. Having lost faith in the Communist leaders, the army – consisting essentially of Russians – will stand on the side of the nationalists. And then, democrats, please forgive the angry Russian. He can make a big mess. It isn't necessary to call Rus' to arms, but remember, they don't need any ext[illegible] couragement. The Russian people with their th[illegible]-year history are not a colossus with clay feet, but rather a giant slipping out from under Marxist oppression. They are just slipping out a bit later than the Germans and French.

The Turkic republics are a burden on Russia. Deliverance from it would make the Russian nation look to her mother – Europe. That would allow the elimination of problems between nationalities and permit the settlement of economic problems.

I ask the editors to forgive me for sending a rough draft of my letter. I just had no paper to write it on: paper in our district sails away to who knows where. Also, please excuse the mistakes: I studied in a Soviet school for average students, not in a tsarist preparatory school.

N. Rozanov,
blue-collar worker
Cherepovets, USSR

The KGB's refutation

Military service or your wife: an officer's choice

Voinovich is wrong

healthy woman arrived at a therapeutic centre who didn't want to take temperatures or take medicines. It would have been better, wouldn't it, for her to give her voucher to a disabled person and, shouldering her backpack, climb the tourist paths to conquer the highest mountains, if there was nothing to do in the health centre. The last words of the article were "To hell with it, come to us!" Come to whom? To the democrats who are straining for power, to a new dictator? And what do we do with those people who aren't "ours"? Shall we act according to the principle "if your enemy doesn't surrender, annihilate him"? There are millions of people in the ranks of the Communist Party. What do we do with them?

V. Efimkov, member of the CP since 1955
Kemerovo Region

■ This year I was in the Volga Region on an excursion through the places where Lenin lived. An interesting picture revealed itself to me. In Kazan, among the beautiful ancient but decaying mansions stood a "palace" of red stone: a memorial to Lenin that must have cost about 15 million rubles. There, almost like in the museum of Madame Tussaud, was a group of mannequins ("revolutionaries") on stairs. What for? All of the museums of the Revolution are well-groomed and scented with flowers, in contrast to the poor local museums. Our cultural heritage of the years past – icons and paintings – rot in storerooms. But you can't replace all of our national culture with political fetishes. How many books and splendid albums are published about the creators of the world's first socialist state! Does anyone actually read them? If only that paper had been used for children's books or art albums on the Hermitage. People would be pleased, and it would be of some use to the government.

False prophets like N.Morozova, who at every step proclaim their love for Lenin, are harmful and dangerous, especially to children. I share the opinion of Tatiana Ivanova on these grounds, and with great pleasure read her "Female Logic," written wisely, fearlessly, and truthfully and without lies.

V. Aleksandrova
Perm

■ I am turning to you for help: I myself am not in a position to do anything to prevent the break-up of my family.

I graduated from the Leningrad Higher Military School of Construction Engineering and for further service was sent to the Vologda region. My wife came to live with me, but after a week she had to return home: the local climate gave her migrains. She asked me to find a different place to serve. I could have just resigned, but I would hate to do that after 5 years of study. But I also didn't feel much like losing a loved one. So I turned to the commander of our unit with a request for a transfer. It was rejected: it seems that family problems are not grounds for a transfer. Maybe that's right. What can I do? How can I continue to work if my heart's not in it? Please don't think that I run from difficulties, it's not that at all. How can I live and work while my domestic life falls apart? Or is it simply impossible to be lucky in our country? Finding one, I am sure to lose the other. What difference does it make where I do my service? Or am I just being naive and am completely out of touch with reality? Does the Homeland now mean something completely different? Is it really only important what system you serve, what connections you have, and how much money you have?

Maybe it was stupid of me to write to you and complain about my problems. I simply don't know what else to do.

Vitaly Sheremetyev
Vologda region

■ In an interview in your magazine (No. 4/91) Vladimir Voinovich stated that sometimes it is necessary to use tanks to resolve conflicts between nationalities.

THE WAY I SEE IT

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

I am a student, and I am only 22 years old, but I can fearlessly say that the famous writer is wrong. It's not possible to resolve an argument in a stranger's house by breaking down the door and letting in the police (by a stranger's house I mean a sovereign republic, and by police – the Soviet army). Nothing can justify bringing troops into foreign territory.

I saw tanks in Yerevan. How terrible it is to believe in justice and suddenly wake up in a nightmare. I know of the tanks in Lithuania and Tbilisi. They don't lead to good, but rather bring only tears and hatred. When troops are really needed, they are for some reason always late. I served my time in the army and can confirm that first-hand.

Please excuse the audacity not to agree with the words of a famous writer. It's not possible, though, to live that way anymore. Where did so much evil come from? How can one live and not value human life? It's not important where a person lives, whether in Afghanistan, Lithuania, Kuwait or wherever. Spilling blood always demands more blood.

David Vanyan, student of department of law of Yerevan University

■ So, we are faced with a major conspiracy. Americans and their allies from "DemRossiya" are trying to use the Armenian nationalists as a wedge between Christian Russia and the Moslems of the south, in order to use Russia in the interests of the Jewish state. The honour of uncovering the conspiracy belongs to the Israeli publicist Robert David.

An article by David appeared in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*. What in his ideas could be attractive to a newspaper that stands guard over the ideals of "the socialist choice"? Similar thoughts were expressed even in pre-revolutionary Russia, when Black Hundred's newspapers contended that "Jews and Armenians" were to blame for all the empire's problems. It is easier for "true Leninists" from *Sovetskaya Rossiya* to agree with David's ideas than to admit that Karabakh is the result of "real socialism," which has driven too many wedges into the relations between the republics. An attempt to free ourselves from them only ends in tragedy.

V. Khachaturov
Krasnodar

***Compiled by* T. Chernova**

EMERGENCY SITUATION

Hostage-taking

Human life – small change in the hands of terrorists

The ghastly notion of hostage-taking has become part of everyday language. Soviet citizens are kidnapped by "unidentified" or well-known national liberation fighters, or to put it simply, by terrorists in an Asian or African country... Armenian or Azerbaijani villagers have disappeared... Ossetians or Georgians are taken hostage...

The transformation of the notion of hostage-taking makes one wonder about the very progress of mankind and the level of its civilization. Hostage-taking was practised in ancient Rome, although on a limited scale. The Romans would take the sons of the rulers of conquered lands to Rome to study the values of civilization. By so doing, the Romans wanted to secure the loyalty of local kings in the new provinces of the empire and to train new rulers in the spirit of enlightenment and fidelity to the Roman Empire.

Later, in the epoch of colonial expansion, hostage-taking became widely used in various forms. The British in India and the French in Northern Africa used to take local people hostage and keep them in captivity until talks with the local rulers concluded on the colonialists' terms. During the Second World War the Germans widely practised hostage-taking as a means of combating resistance fighters and as a form of reprisals for guerilla activities in the German rear. Execution of hostages was a regular practice.

This inhumane practice necessitated the adoption in 1949 of the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. This document prohibits hostage-taking, stressing that this prohibition is a part of the minimum rules governing all belligerents. The principles of the Geneva convention also apply to national liberation movements.

As we can see, however, the Geneva document is considered a mere scrap of paper by many of those who resort to any means, fighting for what they allege to be a brighter future for a particular nation or the eventual happiness of the whole mankind. Can one make the world any happier by killing people?

The face of terrorism

Many Soviet-inspired and Soviet-backed national liberation fronts and movements adopted the doubtful means of "revolutionary struggle" alongside the Kalashnikov submachine guns. Meanwhile, many of these reprehensible means of struggle were tested during the Civil War in this country. In this respect, this country became the world leader. "The Red Army," says the Greater Soviet Encyclopaedia of 1933, "was forced to take hostages from among the bourgeois (kulak) segments of the population in order to bring pressure to bear on the anti-Soviet elements in society."

In 1918 *Vestnik NKVD* reported that the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) instructed local authorities "to immediately arrest all right-wing Social Revolutionaries, and to take hostage a considerable number of people from among the bourgeoisie and officers." After an attempt on Lenin's life and the assassination of Uritsky thousands of paople who had nothing to do with these acts of terror were taken hostage and subsequently executed. A wave of executions swept the country. The February 1919 decree of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence instructed the ChK and the NKVD to take hostages from among the peasants living in the areas where "the removal of snow from the railroads was carried out improperly," warning that "if the snow is not removed, the hostages will be shot." The decree of the Council of People's Commissars issued at the end of 1920 allowed hostages to be taken from among members of the Social Democra-

tic Party. Recent documents have revealed that the well-known Soviet writer Gaydar, popular among young readers, was in the habit of personally shooting hostages through the head if they refused to reveal the whereabouts of the participants in an anti-Soviet uprising.

The regime tried to justify these cruel and unlawful actions by referring to their "necessity".

These methods received an original continuation under Stalin. To keep his lieutenants obedient and fearful, Stalin arrested their closest relatives. In particular, the wives of Molotov and Kalinin spent many years in the Gulag.



Photos from magazines Stern and Der Spiegel (FRG)

The mines of the revolutionary contempt for human life are going off today as well. It is considered a regular practice to take a person from his or her native village at gunpoint, if "the interests of the cause" so command. This is only a step away from kidnapping people for ransom. In this case, however, human life at least fetches some value...

However, the value of human life deserves a special discussion. Isn't the attitude towards the endangered life of a citizen a measure of the government's humanity?

When the Iranians took hostage a group of Americans troops of commandos were immediately sent to free them. When an Israeli citizen gets captured by terrorists, a little war begins... What about the USSR? How should it behave? This is a difficult question. In the past "the hand of Moscow" used to be quite a long one. Suffice it to recall the murders of Leon Trotsky in Mexico and Bandera in Paris much later, in the late 1950s...

It is not civilized, of course, to fight terror with terror. At the same time it is unpatriotic, to say the least, to observe the development of the situation when a Soviet citizen is taken hostage, confining all efforts to expressions of indignation. No political considerations can justify the state's passivity in this case. Negotiations must be conducted along the necessary channels, of course, but this alone is not enough. If the Kremlin issued a resolute and tough warning, hostage-takers might be moved to think about whether the game is worth the candle. If terrorists knew that the Soviet Union had an effective system of freeing its citizens from captivity and that it was too risky to play games with "the hand of Moscow" they would think twice before deciding to take chances.

The attempts to get information on this score from the KGB and the Defence Ministry fell flat. The Consular Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, however, informed me that in emergency situations when it is necessary to free Soviet citizens from terrorists, diplomats are instructed to follow the Consular Rules of the USSR. ■

Kidnapped in Assam

Despite the unending efforts of the Assam authorities, the Delhi government, and the Soviet consulate in Calcutta, Sergey Grishchenko has been reported "killed in an attempted escape."

The miner Sergei Grishchenko arrived in India to work on contract for Coal India Ltd. last January. He worked there waiting for his family to come down from his native town of Prokopyevsk, Kemerovo Region. The Lido coal mine in the Tinong coalfield in Assam is situated in a remote corner of India.

A group of Soviet workers with their families, including children, lived in a fenced-off compound in the town of Magheriti. In the men's absence the security of the compound was provided by a Hindu who would walk away every day at about four. On July 1, at five p.m., someone knocked on the door of the Soviet group's interpreter, Ruslan Takhautdinov. He went out, accompanied by his daughter Renata, 8. They thought they were being visited by local acquaintances of the interpreter. Standing on the threshold were two young strangers. It turned out later that they belonged to the militant separatist organization United Front for the Liberation of Assam (UFLA). They demanded that Takhautdinov follow them. The man tried to resist and a fight started. Takhautdinov's wife rushed out of the house in response to her husband's cries for help. Sergei Grishchenko, who lived next door, ran to Takhautdinov's rescue, too. At that point a third terrorist appeared from the bushes, carrying a gun.

What happened after that was seen only by Ruslan's eight-year-old daughter. She said the terrorists started beating her parents unconscious. Then they took Grishchenko with them. According to the local people, Sergey tried to resist and even shattered a window in the terrorists's car.

On the same day, UFLA members kidnapped 13 Indian civil servants and demanded the release of six arrested Front leaders in exchange for one civil servant and Grishchenko. In case their ultimatum was not satisfied by the deadline of 6 p.m. on July 9, the terrorists threatened to execute the two hostages.

All the demands were satisfied: the six leaders were set free and 650 rank-and-file members amnestied. The Indian govern-

ment and the government of Assam called on the extremists to refrain from the use of violence against the hostages.

However, on the evening of July 9, terrorists circulated a statement dated July 7 to the effect that Grishchenko "had been killed in an attempted escape." The UFLA leaders said the Soviet hostage seized the gun from a terrorist and shot another terrorist, after which he was killed himself. Some observers believe that in light of the circumstances around the Grishchenko murder the actual killing might have been perpetrated earlier, probably on the day of the kidnapping. According to witnesses, a shot was heard while Grishchenko was fighting the kidnappers...

The Soviet consulate general in Calcutta and the government of the USSR demanded that the government of Assam present information about the circumstances of the kidnapping and death of Sergey Grishchenko. The government of Assam immediately conveyed this demand to the leaders of the separatists, who refused to yield to the demand.

In response to the Assam government's proposal of negotiations, which came immediately after the granting of amnesty to separatists, the UFLA leaders demanded that the agenda of such talks "include the issue of granting sovereignty to Assam." The chief minister of the state of Assam, Hiteshwar Saikia, said: "We want peace, but very unfortunately, the Front misinterpreted our gesture of good will as our weakness." The minister also said the crime against a representative of "a friendly power" would have far-reaching consequences.

The group of Soviet specialists, of which Sergey Grishchenko had been a member, was transported to Delhi on their request.

The tragedy in Assam has posed a number of difficult questions, the main one being: How safe are Soviets in India in conditions of spreading terrorism in potentially explosive areas? Despite all assurances to the contrary, the Indian authorities are unable to protect foreign citizens. The spokesman of Coal India Ltd., which hired the Soviet mining specialists, said additional measures would be taken to protect Soviet specialists and their families.

The situation of Soviets in "the friendly country" differs drastically from that of Westerners, in particular in the financial aspect. Westerners who receive pay in hard currency, which is often dozens of times higher than the pay of their Soviet counterparts, can afford to hire bodyguards. As for Soviets, their only choice is to count on their luck...

Boris Zaitsev,
TASS correspondent,
exclusive for *New Times*
DELHI

"He can't be dead..."

Sergey Grishchenko's wife Nelli showed me her husband's photographs. Looking back at me from the pictures was a strong, handsome, young, slightly gloomy man. The photographs were different: the old passport ones, the new ones Sergey had sent from India. Nelli took the photographs to Moscow in order to show them to ESP people, hoping to hear that Sergey is alive. Nelli refuses to believe that her husband is dead. She didn't give me the photographs, probably fearing an evil eye.

So far there has been no confirmation that Grishchenko's dead body has been found. That is why we will be referring to him as a living person.

Sergey Grishchenko is 34. He was born in the village of Berezovka, Novosibirsk Region. After serving in the Soviet Army, he settled in the town of Prokopyevsk, Kemerovo Region, and started work for the Feliks Dzerzhinsky Coal Mine. He took an extra-mural course at the local mining school. Ten years ago he married the charming Nelli, and their son Artur was born a year later.

"Ours is a good family," Nelli said. "There have been some small quarrels to be sure, but is there any family that has not quarrelled? Artur adores his father. I am sure Sergey

Dictatorship of fear

The state of Assam in the north-eastern part of India is one of the hot spots of that country. The history of the local nationalist extremist group, calling itself the United Front for the Liberation of Assam, goes back to 1977, when a xenophobic movement unfolded in the state and was concentrated against people from other regions of India as well as from Nepal and Bangladesh. The UFLA's strategic objective is Assam's secession from India. Actually, the separatists do not recognize Assam as a state of India, they call it a "colony of India."

Armed struggle is viewed as the main way to achieve goals by the organization's 2,000 to 4,000 militants. The UFLA has specially equipped guerrilla camps in the jungle, where new recruits are trained to handle arms and explosives and get basic physical training. Political indoctrination officers educate the recruits in the spirit of militant Maoism. One of the Front's leaders, Phukan, said that the militants' objective is "the creation of a sovereign socialist Assam." "We believe in dialectical materialism," he said. Works of Marx, Engels and Mao are in abundance at the Front camps.

The activities of the Front are supervised by the six-member Executive Committee. The Front is divided into two elements: the civil and the military ones. It operates its own army headed by the commander-in-chief. While they cannot mount large-scale operations against the authorities, the militants resort to terrorist attacks.

The Front has imposed its own tax on the owners of tea plantations and merchants of non-local origin, which amounts to 5 percent of the turnover. In response to this tax the producers of tea – the state's major source of revenue – have stopped all operations in Assam. The economy of the state has been severely damaged. Workers at tea plantations have lost their source of income.

The Front leaders believe that organization of agricultural communes may be a way out of the current critical situation. The communes provide peasants with inexpensive seeds and render various mediatory services. Village schools are being opened in the communes. The Front's activists have started a drive against drug abuse, drinking, and pornography. In practice, the Front has assumed the functions of local authorities.

Close contacts are maintained between the Front and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

There seems to be no military solution to the Assam crisis. The key to the solution of the problems of Assam and other hot spots in India is the nation's economic and social development combined with the democratic values of the Indian Constitution.

Yakov Borovoi

Nelli Grishchenko is sure that her husband is alive. Yaroslav Lavrentyev blames himself for having left for vacation a couple of days before the raid *Photo by K. Isakov*

will return, but if I really must be getting ready for the worst, I don't know how our son is going to live through his father's death." Nelli spoke calmly, but I could see how difficult it was for her to maintain her self-control.

Sergey did not have any special hobbies, but has recently been attracted by photography. Actually, he never had time for hobbies as he worked four shifts on a flexible time schedule. The miner's life has no room for anything but work and home.

"Sergey is a very self-controlled, well-balanced man," Nelli said. "He would always think twice before taking any serious step. He will always step in if someone needs his help. He was never looking for easy jobs, but he never told me about any accidents in the mine."

Last September a tragedy occurred in the mine where Sergey worked: his partner and close friend was buried alive before Sergey's very eyes. This made a lasting impression on Sergey. After a medical check-up the doctors suggested that he not return to work at the mine, and Nelli took their side. Sergey refused to listen, though. There was no way to talk him out of this: even when he was ill and had a fever he never missed work.

Unexpectedly, Sergey was offered a business trip to India. "I don't think I need to tell you how miners live in Kemerovo," Nelli said. "People want to go abroad not because of their thirst for exotic impressions, but because they want to make the life of their families easier. Sergey said he would work in India for some time, return to the USSR and quit the work at the mine."

Says Yaroslav Lavrentyev, head of the group of Soviet workers in Assam:

"We lived together in cottages surrounded by a stone wall. The relations with the local people were quite friendly. The Indians used to come to our place to play volley-ball, ping-pong and other games. They used to visit us casually. We never thought of any danger or threat, although we knew that the situation in the state was complicated... The manual labour was prevailing in the mines. The miners used picks to extract coal and the coal was transported to the surface in one-ton trolleys, also driven manually. If work were organized in a proper manner, at least fifty percent of the workers could be fired. In India, however, the main thing is to provide people with jobs. Our task was to teach Indian miners to use Soviet techniques in order to double the output..."

Yaroslav is blaming himself for having left for vacation a couple of days before the kidnapping. "If I had not left, and if my partner had not been at the mine, everything might have been different..."

Nelli and Artur were supposed to join Sergey in India by August. All they needed was the official invitation. And suddenly came the blow: Sergey Grishchenko is taken hostage and reproted killed...

"I have been reluctant to watch TV or read papers lately," Nelli said. "I don't believe what the media says. And still... I watch TV and read papers hoping to find the news that Sergey is alive. He can't be dead. Perhaps the terrorists issued that statement on purpose? And the fact that someone heard shots does not mean anything..."

Konstantin Isakov

Hostage-taking is resorted to in all interethnic conflicts in the Soviet Union

Initially, the conflicting sides in Ossetia used to take hostages in order to later exchange them for prisoners taken by the opposing side. However, this practice had to be rejected because of the absence of a link between the Ossetian and Georgian sides. Recently hostages have been taken in order to be later exchanged for weapons or sums of money big enough to buy a submachine gun. That is why the usual ransom amounts to 30,000–50,000 rubles. Once a ransom of 100,000 rubles was paid for a Georgian whom the hostage-takers believed to be a high-ranking official. Neither Georgia nor Ossetia provide even approximate data about the number of hostages kept by either side.

All kinds of ransom are demanded in Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent districts of Azerbaijan, where people are exchanged for money, arms and other prisoners. Sometimes hostages are taken to guarantee the security of a village. As a rule, this form of hostage-taking does not work. The Azerbaijani side has not supplied any information about the number of Azerbaijani hostages. According to the Armenian Mission in Moscow, 453 people were taken hostage by the Azerbaijanis in May-June of this year. 366 of them were released later and 3 were killed. The recent events in Nagorno-Karabakh have increased the number of hostages there. The Armenian side also considers people in Azerbaijani prisons and those detained by the Azerbaijani OMON to be hostages.

In the Soviet Union, hostage-taking is punishable under the Criminal Code article dealing with "unlawful detention." If hostage-taking is not accompanied by severe bodily damage to the victim and does not constitute a threat to the victim's life, it fetches a prison term of up to six months, corrective work of the same duration, or public reprimand. Otherwise the hostage-taker is in for up to three years in prison.

Three weeks ago Georgia adopted a law stipulating more severe punishment for hostage-taking.

The Lebanese drama

An event unprecedented in the history of civil-war-ravaged Lebanon happened on September 30, 1985 in Beirut. A group of extremist Muslim militants kidnapped and held hostage four Soviet citizens who worked in Lebanon: diplomats Oleg Spirin and Arkady Katkov, staff worker of the Soviet trade mission Valery Mirkov and the embassy practitioner Nikolai Svirsky. The hitherto unknown Islamic Liberation Organization assumed responsibility for the kidnapping.

On the day after the kidnapping, the terrorists circulated photographs of the hostages, each with a gun thrust against his temple. At the same time, the ILO presented an ultimatum: the Soviet citizens will be executed if the Syria-backed forces of the Lebanese left-wing parties do not stop their offensive against the Sunni Muslim forces participating in the so-called Islamic Unification Movement in the vicinity of the North Lebanese city of Tripoli.

The terrorists must have calculated that the Soviet Union, which maintained close ties with Syria and many Lebanese political parties, would bring pressure to bear on them and facilitate a ceasefire.

The ILO threats were not idle. On October 2 an unidentified man called the Soviet embassy, saying that the dead body of Arkady Katkov was found in one of the districts of southern Beirut. The grim information was soon confirmed. Katkov became the first and, fortunately, the last Soviet representative killed in Lebanon throughout the civil war. By the way, the foreign press speculated that Katkov might have died of a grave wound he received during the kidnapping, and so was not killed on purpose.

The Soviet government and secret service did not hesitate to take urgent measures to facilitate the release of the Soviet citizens. Working contacts were set up with the leaders of all sides involved in the Lebanese conflict. At the same time, the Soviet government issued a statement which said that the Soviet Union was in no way involved in the activities of the Lebanese groups warring in Tripoli. The Soviet government demanded that the Soviet citizens be released immediately and unconditionally, and stressed that any delay in their release or any violence against the hostages would only increase the guilt of all those involved in this.

At the beginning of October, the fighting in Tripoli subsided somewhat, although it can't be said for sure that the Soviet Union was somehow instrumental in this. The leader of the IUM, sheikh Shaaban, was taken to Damascus, where he negotiated with the vice-president of Syria, Khaddam. According to the foreign media, Ayatollah Homeini acted as a middleman. Practically all influential Lebanese parties and organizations condemned the act of terrorism vis-à-vis Soviet citizens. Some statements contained threats addressed to the perpetrators. A representative of the Progressive Socialist Party pointed out that the terrorist attack in Beirut had been directed "not only against the friend of the Arabs, the Soviet Union, but also against all patriotic forces. The party will not remain indifferent in the face of this crime. We demand that the Soviet citizens be released immediately," he said.

Indications were that the kidnappers were feeling rather uncomfortable. They often changed the place where they kept the hostages, transporting them in special containers concealed under the car bottoms. The terrorists kept the hostages for a month and released them only on October 30.

While in captivity, the three Soviet citizens displayed remarkable courage. Upon their release they were decorated with state awards and soon resumed work in Beirut.

Victor Titov

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The photographs circulated by the terrorists: A. Katkov, O. Spirin, V. Mirkov, N. Svirsky

Unveiling the mystery...

Here is another version of the events that the Soviet press did not write about. The real credit for the release of the four Soviet hostages is due to the Soviet secret service, which contacted the leadership of the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon with which the Soviet Union maintained friendly relations. Representatives of the secret service warned the terrorists that to continue holding the hostages would mean trouble. The terrorists did not heed the warning. After this, Soviet friends from the PSPL took the matter into their own hands, taking a different approach to the problem. They captured one of the terrorists involved in the kidnapping, cut his head off and mailed it to the leaders of the extremist group. The parcel was received by the addressee, and the hostages were freed immediately. Our friends may have overdone their bit, but as a result, there were only two losses: one Soviet citizen and one terrorist. In the context of a violent civil war the losses were minimized, and combat operations, which might have resulted in a heavy loss of life, were avoided.

Dmitry Zgersky

The axe falls

Sergey KOVALYOV, Chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic, comments on Yeltsin's departification decree

The old structures of power continue to remain very powerful and effective. So far the executive branch of Russia has not been able to do much due to the resistance of those old structures. Regional Communist Party committees instructed the district committees, while the latter circulated the instructions among the primary party organizations. Thus Communist Party decisions became binding for CPSU members occupying official positions... No reforms are possible in the context of this unlawful intervention of ideological institutions in the practical affairs of the state. In any civilized country a civil servant is subordinate only to official structures of power. As for this country, it continues to be a sad exception to the rule... In general, it is obvious that the departification decree is necessary: state officials must be controlled by state power alone!

Boris Yeltsin's departification decree is both fully constitutional and logical. If the new edition of the Soviet Constitution includes a mention of the CPSU in its Article 6, thus stressing the Communist Party's privileged position, the Constitution of the Russian Republic makes no such mention. Furthermore, the recently enacted law on the militia directly mentions the necessity of the departification of the militia in the Russian Republic.

The president of Russia has resolutely used his power to issue this critically important decree a few days after his inauguration. Time is precious. There is too little time for reforms. I do not think the Supreme Soviet of Russia in its current composition would have been able to make this principled decision.

The ideologues of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Russia have already called the departification decree, issued on the eve of the RCP and CPSU plenums, "the trial balloon of confrontation." In fact, was it really necessary to corner the ideological enemy on the eve of the unavoidable political division? Was it necessary to help the adversary to consolidate by creating a sense of threat?

Undoubtedly, the Yeltsin decree will provoke a retaliation on the part of the Communists fully in accordance with the rules of the political struggle. However, there is another threat as well: the weakness of the executive branch may provoke a well-prepared and premeditated, although disguised, resistance of the Communist Party. The Yeltsin decree is a showdown and a challenge. But a timely and lawful challenge at that. One may have doubts as to whether the president chose the tactically happiest moment to issue his decree, but this open and sincere stance is very attractive. The more so as Yeltsin's electorate is waiting for resolute steps on his part. So are Yeltsin's adversaries and opponents.

The people of Russia have elected the president so that he will act, not remain idle. This should not be forgotten. In the situation when unavoidable but highly unpopular economic decisions will have to be made, the trust of the voters has to be justified and cultivated.

The presidential team will not be able to raise living standards or fill the shops. In this situation political decision have to be made, which do not require a long time to be prepared. Even the most politically illiterate voter in Russia understands now what the main obstacle to the reforms is. If Yeltsin hesitated with this showdown, he would be suspected of an inclination to compromise.

I cannot say now whether the Yeltsin decree is going to work and whether the Communist Party will be strong enough to cripple it. It is senseless to issue such decrees without knowing how to implement them. I do not think this decree is the last one. A reform of the executive branch is being prepared. What's more, Yeltsin is relying on the support of the people of Russia. It will be a tough task for the party committees to disobey as long as the president enjoys the trust of the people, which is still euphoric about Russia's own presidency. It looks like this is a matter of trust in exchange for trust. You trusted me enough to make me president, Yeltsin tells the voters, now I trust you enough to kick out the apparatchiks. In this respect the departification decree is a call to the voters and citizens of Russia.



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

I think that although the decree stipulates professional career opportunities for former workers of party committees (they will have to remember what diplomas they received), civil rights of Communists may be violated in individual cases. In this case, the Human Rights Committee will have to undertake the unpopular but only possible task to protect the rights of these people... I said it long ago: the human rights activists of the 1960s and 1970s will have to protect Communists some day.

Naturally, the decree does not affect such powerful federal structures as the Armed Forces, the Interior Ministry and the KGB, where CPSU organizations will remain as strong as they have always been. The president of Russia instructs the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic to consider submitting an appropriate legislation to the federal parliament. However, I can hardly see the latter responding to this initiative today. I think that this point is fraught with the greatest danger of confrontation. Anyhow, this confrontation will be a legislative conflict, not a clash of political decisions. No one will be referring to the decisions of the Central Committee or the Council of People's Commissars – by the way, the Yeltsin decree mentions the abolition of their unlawful decisions. What is there to object to in the decree?

How long will the federal parliament be able to procrastinate in the process? Intermediate elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR will soon take place, and the attitude of federal lawmakers to the departification decree may become a litmus paper for the voters. In this respect the Yeltsin decree may have far-reaching consequences...

Recorded by Lev Yelin

A party within a party

The split the Bolsheviks feared for so long is now a reality

Russia's Vice-President Alexander RUTSKOI has announced the formation of the Democratic Party of Communists of Russia. Its programme is set in our magazine by members of its brain trust – professors **Grigory VODOLAZOV, Boris KAPUSTIN, Vasily LIPITSKY** and **Igor PANTIN.**

Socialism. In the opinion of the conservative wing of the Communist Party, the foundations of socialism had been built in the Soviet Union by the 1930s. By that time the country had developed "socialized industry, large-scale collectively-run agricultural production, a planned system of management," a socially just and economically effective society. True, in the subsequent period Khrushchev's reforms with their "bourgeois" aspects made the system of "foundations" somewhat dim. The perestroika of the 1980s is eroding the foundations and pushing the country and society forward on the "capitalist" road.

What kind of "socialism" can one talk about? What "achievements," "democracy" and "social security"? We have built an anti-humane, economically ineffective, totalitarian and socially antagonistic society.

Non-economic coercion kept the Soviet Union going for some time. However, it is senseless to make people run the economy thriftily, improve technology and advance science – and such is the main line of economic development today.

Perestroika. "Perestroika has failed," Ivan Polozkov, leader of the Russian Communist Party, solemnly declared some time ago. In his opinion, perestroika could evidently be considered successful if all "foundations of socialism" were preserved. The basic foundation is the undivided sway of partocracy.

In our opinion, perestroika is gaining momentum. The first and very important step has been made, namely, the dismantling of the former official myths. The task now is to work out a new democratic policy and build a new – market – economy. We are now at the crucial moment of development, when the type of perestroika is changing from the process directed and regulated from above by reformers from among the top leaders of the Communist Party to a process shaped by the people. Our main efforts are now directed at this reforming of perestroika.

Personnel. We believe that immense harm has been done to our country by self-complacent ignorant leaders who came to power in an undemocratic way, by excessively ideologized "scientists" and selfish illiterate officials – all those who had been brought up in the spirit of violence over economic laws. The economy at all levels – from the countrywide scale to a workers' team – must be run by skilful and responsible specialists, and no one should hinder them in their competent work.

Social protection. Scaring the people with the offensive of new "capitalists," who will exploit them, the party and government officials want, as before, to exploit the people within the same bounds of private property, departmental and state. The Russian Communist Party describes as social protection its attempts to protect the working people from a market economy. The task is quite different. The people should be given an opportunity to work under the conditions of a market economy. Only a market economy ensures people a free choice of the sphere in which they can apply their forces. Creative activity is stimulated only by a market economy, and not by some outside force.

Economic freedom is the right of man to choose his place in the mixed economy with its various forms of property and ties between producers and the means of production. Let man choose his destiny himself. The society and the state must ensure equal rights for employers and workers on the labour market. It is a different matter when social protection is needed by those who are not competitive on the labour market, first of all disabled persons, elderly people, students and, of course, children. Protection against inflation is also needed by those who receive only a salary as the source of income – doctors, teachers, government employees, and so on. In this case it is necessary to find a relationship between the amount and quality of work and its payment.

The open economy. The goods manufactured by most of our enterprises are not competitive on the world market. The modernization of enterprises requires huge expenditures. The Soviet Union is unable to do it on its own. It needs large investments, not just loans and credits from the West. We shall try to overcome the ideological obstacles standing in the way



and fight against those who frighten the people with the threat of the "sell-out" of Russia. The country and its wealth are sold out by those who today want to check our movement to a market economy and the civilized world.

Our people must "defend" themselves not against a market economy, but first of all against the mediocre and parasitic government bureaucracy. A market economy is a means of defence against the arbitrary rule of this bureaucracy, its desire to take possession of all the goods manufactured in the country and then "benevolently" distribute them not according to the work done, but according to the caste principle.

We see that as before it is not the democratic forces and the people, but the bureaucrats who determine the ways, forms and speed of movement to a market economy. We witness the formation of an alliance between high-placed bureaucrats (who use government and party levers to set up their own monopolies in the course of privatization) and the economic mafia. Forms of defence against "marketeers" of this type should be worked out indeed.

Morals and politics. A well-known formula says, "Marxism has not a grain of ethics" (in the sense that it is a strictly scientific sociological theory which deals with historical necessity and therefore does not need definitions from the standpoint of "good," "evil," "justice," and so on). Ethical principles, alternatives, and choices were not recognized by Marxism and were labelled by it as "abstract humanism."

Viewed on a broader plane, moral imperatives are higher than both economic requirements and our traditional policy, which was guided exclusively by relations between classes. We need not only the shaping of a market economy, but also a democratic way to the civilized market, not simply strong executive power, but its combination with a strong parliament, not sham pluralism of views, but a democratic development of parties and competition between them.

In founding a new party, we recognize our responsibility for the present disastrous condition of the country.

The recognition of this responsiblity obliges the new party to do everything to ensure that the dismantling of the Russian Communist Party and the CPSU does not lead to general chaos. Our aim is to single out different trends from the CPSU and found independent parties on their basis according to ideological and political principles. The new party should include the democratic forces and the ideological legacy of the CPSU which was pushed into the background and suppressed. This must be done not for the sake of preserving the "healthy part" of the CPSU but in order to maintain what can become an essential component of democratic policy during the transition period in our country.

The main lines of policy of our new party in the transition period:

–the building of a democratic national and state system of the Russian Federation as a union of independent peoples enjoying equal rights and as a union of the historically established territories of Russia;

–the constitutional winning of a majority of democratic forces in the Soviets at all levels in order to transform them into structures of representative democracy, and the division of legislative, executive and judicial powers at higher levels;

–all-round development within the bounds of a multiparty system and civil society and the complete guarantee of political and civil rights and freedoms for the people;

–the organizing of "round tables" under government bodies at different levels, with the participation of all political forces (irrespective of who they represent) acting in a given territory;

–all-round development within legal bounds of principles of self-government and independent action implemented in the activity of work collectives, local associations and voluntary movements and societies of different kinds;

–removal of party branches from state institutions – the prosecutor's office, bodies of justice, the KGB and the army, and the government apparatus.

We reject the principle of "strict adherence to Marxism-Leninism," contained in the Communist Party's main ideological demand on each of its members.

However profound and "scientific" one or another doctrine may be, life is always richer and more original. We shall test our intentions and actions not by the way they conform to quotations from classics, but by the way they serve the interests of our people. We do not consider that the works of Marx contain all the wisdom of humanity. Besides, of no less and perhaps of even greater significance for us are the ideas of outstanding Russian thinkers. Such brilliant and profound theoreticians as Max Weber, John Keynes, Milton Friedman, and John Galbraith are also wise assistants in helping us understand the destinies of the present-day world.

We are a democratic party existing at present within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We are not going to withdraw form the CPSU and thus leave it to conservatives. The present CPSU must disappear. It was the pivot of the authoritarian system. In a new democratic society there is simply no room for such a specific state administrative organization as the former CPSU. We want to bring about a civilized division of political forces. In the present conditions this means the dismantling of the CPSU. During the transition (and probably short) period of the division of forces in the CPSU we shall be called the Democratic Party of Communists of Russia, and believe that the adjective "communist" will not long remain in the title of our organization.

Remaining within the CPSU during the transition period, we shall also try to separate the democratic traditions which existed in its history from totalitarian traditions and unite millions of ordinary members on the basis of democratic traditions in order to embark jointly on the road of building genuine democracy.

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Drawing by Arkady Gursky

Conflicts over hadj

Alla Glebova,
Valery Shchekoldin (picture credits)

In broad daylight, near the building where the Russian parliament holds its sessions, a score of plainclothesmen arrested four elderly men, who wore Muslim caps. They were organizers of the hadj – pilgrimage to Mecca – of Daghestan Muslims

The captured men were handcuffed and taken in Zhiguli cars without licence plates to the 64th militia station near the Butyrka prison. Three of them were soon freed after they had signed a statement that they would report to the local KGB on returning to Makhachkala, the administrative centre of Daghestan. The fourth man, Khasbulat Khasbulatov, was put in Butyrka to be later transported to his native land of Daghestan.

In January 1990, Khasbulat Khasbulatov was elected deputy chairman of the Jamaat Muslim (Muslim Society) executive committee. The society was registered at the Leninsky district Soviet of Makhachkala in March 1990. The aim of the organization is to strengthen Islam on the basis of comandments contained in the sharia. One of the main tasks is to comply with the Koran's commandment by organizing the hadj for all Muslims who wish to make such a trip. In 1990, when Soviet Muslims decided to go to Mecca for the first time, Khasbulatov was among those who went on a hunger strike on Moscow's Red Square. The strike ended successfully: each of the 330 pilgrims paid only 5,000 rubles for the trip they undertook that year.

On May 7, 1991, shortly before the hadj of this year, Khristoradnov, chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs, sent a letter to the Religious Board of Daghestan Muslims, advising it to send the same number of pilgrims as in 1990, buy air tickets to Saudi Arabia for hard currency and acquire it at the stock exchange rate of 37.6 rubles for one dollar. Following these recommendations, a Daghestani Muslim would have to pay 30,000 rubles for his trip. By March 1991, over 10,000 people had expressed the desire to go to Mecca. All of them thought they would have to pay only 5,000 rubles for the trip, as others did in 1990.

On June 3, 1991, Khasbulatov was elected chairman of the assembly of angry Muslims. Later

on, calls for the resignation of the Daghestan government were added to the demands for reducing the cost of the hadj to the 1990 level, thus making it possible for all who wished to go.

Daghestani Muslims called June 13 "bloody Thursday." On that day the militia used arms against the crowd which had broken the cordons at the Daghestan parliament building. Three persons were wounded. The parliament declared a state of emergency in Makhachkala. On June 17, the prosecutor's office started criminal proceedings against Khasbulatov and issued a warrant for his arrest.

"What we have is a conflict on religious grounds. Islam has openly asserted itself for the first time," said Rashid Isayev, deputy minister of the interior of Daghestan. Victor Chudenko, head of the Daghestan KGB's group for investigating the June 13 events, believes that "Khasbulatov is the leader of a group of extremists. Ask people in the street – the attitude towards him is sharply negative. Besides, Khasbulatov is dangerous. We have found reinforcement bars in the bushes around the square. They have been added to the documents of the case as material evidence." True, Chudenko admitted that militiamen found bars in the bushes after a state of emergency was declared and, moreover, that they were not used by Muslims in the square.

In traditionally Muslim villages, the attitude of people to Khasbulatov is positive. In Gubden, to which I went even though I was advised not to for reasons of personal security, he is respected as "a decent man working for the good of the people." In Makhachkala people indeed spoke disparingly of Khasbulatov and Muslims in general. Any taxi driver would tell you that Muslims go on a pilgrimage so that they can gain profit later on. They bring home video tape recorders and "holy water," which they sell at 25 rubles a spoonful. Some would even add: "They (Muslims) resort to extortionate practices and want to fly to Saudi Arabia at someone else's expense. And in general, they disgraced Daghestan because of the need to introduce a state of emergency."

In fact, the reasons for declaring the state of emergency are not as evident as it seems at first sight. The Daghestan leaders, most of whom are protégés of the republican Communist Party committee which is a power behind the scenes, have been frightened by the growing activity of the population. Many parties (the Islamic Party of Rebirth, Islamic Democratic Party, and Social Democratic Party) took advantage of the rally of Muslims for the propaganda of anti-communist ideas.

At the entrance to Makhachkala airport: the passport proved of no use

The new authorities of the Russian Federation, of which Daghestan is a constituent part, are much more popular than local ones. For instance, 66.9 percent of the republic's electorate voted for Yeltsin. The percentage of "yes" votes was especially high among Muslims. In the villages of Gubden and Gurbuki it was 95 and 97 percent respectively. Some think that in a situation like this a state of emergency is a way of struggling to keep power.

True, early in June the crime rate increased. After an explosion in a Moscow-Baku train on May 30, unknown terrorists perpetrated several more crimes in the first half of June. They tried to assassinate the republic's trade minister Gadjiev (who made a narrow escape while seven were wounded) and Akavov, deputy chairman of the republic's state economic committee (who also made a narrow escape). Other events aroused fear, not even fright, in the republic.

In the village of Levashi, the elderly people refuse to bury people who are not natives of that place. According to the Koran, it is a cruel vengeance on non-believers. The refusal to bury non-natives is explained by the fact that the party and government officials sent to Levashi abused their authority and used public land at their own discretion. The old people of Levashi did not make an exception even for the dead mother of the current chairman of the Daghestan parliament.

Knowing the firmness of the believers, the Daghestan leadership tried simultaneously to gratify their wishes and defame them in the eyes of the public. On June 3, it sent a letter to Premier Pavlov, asking him to increase the quota of pilgrims from Daghestan and allow them to buy currency at the commercial, not stock exchange rate and air tickets for rubles.

Pavlov denied the request. After the premier went to Yugoslavia, his deputy Doguzhiev partly complied with the Daghestan leadership's request. The quota of pilgrims was increased to 1,200 (of a total of 4,000 from the USSR), and 850 people were allowed to buy air tickets for rubles. Simultaneously, the Daghestan government "advised" the enterprises of the republic to give their meagre currency reserves to the pilgrims. Some 80,000 dollars were transferred to the account of the Religious Board of Muslims for exchange at the rate suitable for Muslims. But the money was not claimed. At the same time, television broadcast the statements by representatives of work collectives, who branded Muslims as extortioners and demanded that the rally be broken up. In this way "public opinion" was shaped in Makhachkala.

The government's initiative was fiercely opposed by Muslims who, following the Koran, intended to go on a pilgrimage on their own savings only. Khasbulatov's main argument that "the 30,000 rubles' cost of the hadj closes the road to Mecca for Muslims who live on their wages" met with understanding even among militiamen. The people who gathered in Makhachkala's central square kept insisting that they did not want to solve their problems at the expense of work collectives or funds assigned to compensate for the growth of prices for prime necessities.

Muslims refuse to believe the official information that only wounded people were taken to hospital from the square on June 13. The first TV reports about a seriously wounded man who later died in a hospital were contradictory. Doctors said that the man was wounded in his neck either by a sharp or blunt object. Later on they admitted on television that it was a bullet wound. In a conversation with me a doctor on duty said that the bullet was "outside" the X-ray picture of the neck (sic!). Nevertheless, it is recorded in the case history – which, according to deputy chief doctor Rafik Butayev, is filed at the time of hospitalization – that the man concerned, Abdulgamid Abdulbasirov, 33 years old, was brought to the hospital on June 13 "with a bullet wound in his neck." The bullet splintered a cervical vertebra and remained in the soft tissue. The patient was paralyzed. The republic's public health minister visited him every morning on his way to the ministry. A consultant from Moscow's research institute of operative surgery was invited. The authorities feared the death of Abdulbasirov. When he died, a large crowd gathered for his funeral. People still think that they were deceived, that it was the dead body of Abdulbasirov that was kept in the hospital from the outset.

The imposition of a state of emergency showed that none and nothing threatened people in Makhachkala. According to the information of Daghestan's interior ministry, the identity cards of 800 people were checked and 3,000 private cars inspected between June 13 and 16. As a result, 26 knives, 4 pistols and 13 hunting cartridges were taken away. The militia explained their failure by the fact that their forces were not united.

In connection with the departure of pilgrims for Saudi Arabia, about 100 armed militiamen were on duty at the Makhachkala airport for three days from June 13. Owing to a muddle in the lists of pilgrims, the registration for each special flight to Jidda and boarding lasted about seven hours on the average. The last two flights had to be cancelled. About 40 Muslims who had all the necessary papers and had paid for the pilgrimage were unable to get into the airport building. After the cancellation of flights, an armoured personnel carrier arrived in the airport to avert manifestations of protest. Women cried for a while and went away.

On June 18, Daghestan's interior ministry carried out an operation, which was to be the culmination of militia action under the state of emergency. About 120 militiamen and roughly the same number of armed troopers from the forces of the Inteiror Ministry of the USSR conducted a search at four hotels and in the waiting room of the railway station. They were looking for armed Muslims from rural areas. Instead, they detained 32 people for violating the rules of living at hotels. Twelve persons who had no identity cards were detained in the waiting room of the railway station and one knife was taken away.

In the opinion of Daghestan's interior ministry officials, there was no need to declare the state of emergency, the more so without a curfew and restriction of movement. It was necessary to state that the rally of Muslims had not been authorized and to order the militia to disperse the crowd. However, I was told in the interior ministry, "the leaders of the republic are too afraid of losing their posts to display firmness at the necessary moment."

A commission of members of the Russian parliament will examine whether it was lawful to declare a state of emergency and will analyze the events which took place in Makhachkala's central square. The promise to send the commission to Daghestan was made by deputy Chairman of the Russian Parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov in a conversation with Khasbulat Khasbulatov. The latter was arrested at the entrance to the Russian parliament building where he wanted to find out the exact composition of the commission and when it will come to Daghestan. In the republic, militiamen are going from flat to flat in search of Muslims who took part in the events in the central square of Makhachkala. Proceedings have been initiated against more than 30 people.

On June 13, "bloody Thursday," the Muslims of Makhachkala decided not to send "their children to Soviet schools and the Soviet army, not to bury Communists in Muslim cemeteries, and to seek the death penalty for militiamen who shot at unarmed people." Though the decision was made by Muslims only, it bears little relation to religion.

MAKHACHKALA–MOSCOW

Something about ethics and politics

The way we see it

This letter was sent to the Pravda newspaper on July 5. For two weeks since then, Pravda – probably in accordance with its own rules of journalistic ethics – has never made up its mind about printing it. Therefore, we are compelled to make it public in our own magazine. The readers are kindly requested to excuse the delay which is not our fault

To the *Pravda* editorial board

Dear colleagues,

Issue 159 of *Pravda*, dated July 4, carried a note by Oleg Shenin entitled "The way I see it": comments on two *New Times* articles, one by Marina Shakina, a colleague of mine, and the other by myself. I should like to thank the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for the attention he has paid to our modest work. I wish, however, that he were more accurate, specific, and made out his case more convincingly. I think it will be only natural if I address these remarks directly to him.

Dear Oleg Semyonovich, you have the following complaints to make about my article: "The weekly's Editor-in-Chief is probably of the opinion that President Gorbachev is in no position to decide, without his help, who of the members of the USSR Security Council, and to what extent, qualifies for his post, and informed the Soviet and world public about that in a most tactless form..." Scintillating sarcasm! In the Soviet Union, the government needs no recommendations from the public, I admit. The article, however, says not even a word about the USSR Security Council and its members. The article was about a different security institution, the KGB – more specifically, about its Chairman and still more specifically about the recent statement he made at a closed session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The speaker announced, "secretly" but for all to hear, that the country was in danger of a catastrophe. This is hardly news to anyone, except that he sees the source of the imminent catastrophe not in the collapse of the socio-economic system which has reached a deadlock, exhausted its growth potential, and demonstrated its complete inability to satisfy human needs but, once again, in the crafty designs of the enemy. The Chairman of the KGB emphatically argued against the country going to a free market, against our re-integration into the world economy, against cooperation with the West.

It seemed to me that I had made myself clear enough to avoid misunderstandings. It does not become a man holding such a post to tell the deputies cock-and-bull stories about "agents of influence" and the CIA which have ruined our national economy, even if such stories were concocted by Andropov. Why put a war scare into the people by telling them that another June 22 is coming and that some unnamed country is planning to occupy the Soviet Union? And why all those hysterical complaints about the present leadership being as unmindful of the intelligence service's warnings as Stalin had been before the catastrophe? If such figments of the top brass' imagination are no longer taken seriously, then thank God.

Chairman of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, scared the public and censured the President in his "secret" but for-all-to-hear speech he made at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. This was spoken of in *NT* No. 26

Oleg Shenin, member of the Politbureau, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, took up the cudgels for the Chairman of the KGB, by accusing the *NT* editors of a violation of journalistic ethics

For the *Pravda* editors, all are equal, but CPSU Central Committee Secretaries are more equal than others. The famous Discussion Tabloid failed to include *New Times* opinion

More generally speaking, my colleague and I strongly objected to the State Security Committee distorting facts, engaging in political and pseudo-ideological intrigues, applying secret service methods (or style, at least) to the political process, a practice which is incompatible with democracy.

You, Oleg Semyonovich, have decided to take up the cudgels for Vladimir Alexandrovich. This is understandable. The CPSU is a party whose mission it is to render social protection to the working people, and the KGB Chairman falls into the "working man" category. You could have done better, however.

First of all it would have been more logical if you had contributed your response to the publication where the critical articles originally appeared. We would have gladly given you a chance to speak up on our pages. It is common practice the world over to respond to criticism in the publication which has come up with it. Having acquainted himself with one judgement, a regular reader will find a different one then and there, which makes the picture more complete and more authentic. By sending your remarks to *Pravda*, you have simply added all its subscribers to the *New Times'* regular readership. What are we to do now, print another edition of our Issue No. 26? You didn't want to give us such wide publicity, surely!

Incidentally, we hope that Vladimir Alexandrovich Kryuchkov will send us a personal response to our articles rather than instruct his public relations men or other anonymous "soldiers of the invisible front" to write it for him. Such a response will hardly satisfy our readers.

Second, why don't you furnish any convincing evidence in support of your case? In my article I have mentioned certain scandalous facts, but you do not refute them. Does that imply that the facts are true, but you have reason to draw different conclusions from them? In that case, kindly substantiate these conclusions. Do you think that Vladimir Kryuchkov's speech was not alarmist at all but wise, well-balanced, fully correct, and not at all insulting to the President? Well, go ahead and prove this from the height of your experience and position.

"Do not forget about ethics," you recommend. Political journalism will forget all about ethics, lose all its worth, and betray its cause if it stops analyzing politics and politicians.

There was a time when Agitprop confused impartiality with genuflexion. I am not sure that this practice, common until quite recently, has sunk into oblivion.

Alexander Pumpyansky,
Editor-in-Chief, *New Times* magazine

SEVEN PLUS ONE

Keeping a promise



Drawing from the European

The London Summit as our special correspondents Alexander Pumpyansky and Sergei Babusenko saw it

Indeed, it is only one step from the sublime to the ridiculous.

One news agency (guess which) reported that A. Rubiks, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia, had had a get-together with the Party activists of the Zemgale Region. Previously, the Party Secretaries of the Latgale zone and the Pskov Region had gathered in session. Their demands boiled down to convening an extraordinary congress of the CPSU and "expelling Gorbachev from the Party."

It is hard to tell whether Gorbachev read this report. He might not have the time for that – he had too many things to attend to on that particular day.

That day in London

That was the very day when Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush announced that the long-range nuclear arms reduction treaty had been drafted down to the last detail and would be signed in Moscow before this month was out, during the new Soviet-American summit.

That was the day when the prodigal son returned home at last – to use a Biblical image – and the door of his house was open to him. By the prodigal son I do not mean Gorbachev but us, our wretched people, who have been lured to the desert, spent seventy years there, chasing the mirages of an utopia. I mean our great nation which selflessly struggle along "the only right track" until finally reached the deadlock, a point of no return, it seemed. Fortunately, the deadlock has been broken at last.

That was the day which marked the culmination of all the achievements of our times, the day when the Cold War died for the second time and, hope-

fully, forever. It had died for the first time when the soldiers got tired of the burden of confrontation. What followed was not quite peace but armistice, a respite, and there was always the danger of new soldiers, more orthodox and more violent coming to replace the ones who had given up. In London, however, it became clear that there was nothing to war over. The historical conflict between socialism and capitalism had exhausted itself. The USSR – neither the messiah, not a bugaboo any longer – is re-uniting with the family of mankind. The world has ceased to be divided into two antagonistic "camps" ready to clash in an apocalyptic battle of mutual annihilation; now it is one integral civilization to which the Soviet Union is returning the most reliable way – the economic way. Instead of gloating over our humility or trying to trip us up, the West is prepared to help us return to normal.

All this came to light on that day in London.

Capitalism: success story

Peter Jenkins, the Independent columnist, sets forth the history of Group of Seven as follows.

Sixteen years ago President Valery Giscard d'Estaing of France invited his colleagues to Rambouillet for a calm discussion, "at the fireside", of the acute problems the Western – i.e. the world – economy faced as a result of the oil crisis. An economist by training and an aristocrat by birth, he considered himself off-beat (once he had even asked a dustman over for lunch to Palais d'Elysee), and the intimacy of that unofficial "summit meeting" gave it a special atmosphere.

Sixteen years later, everything went almost according to Giscard d'Estaing's scenario, except that the summit participants rode in monstrous black limousines brought to the British Isles by air, and were accompanied by what looked like myriads of guards and journalists. Oh, that insatiable press! It did not merely hang on the lips of the eight most important "dramatis personae" and numerous less important ones. It also devoured 80 crates of tender salmon, half a ton of first-class beef, 1,000 gallons of beer and 100 gallons of delicious cream – all of which the sponsor companies considered it a privilege to deliver to the press centre free of charge. These statistics (which we were partly responsible for) go to show that in the West, too, pressmen are curried favour with, but in a manner different from that common in our country. Over there, it won't occur to anyone to accuse the press of ingratitude, although there seems to be reason to do that.

Indeed, the press showed no respect for what the seven leaders were doing and engaged in sweeping criticism instead. To believe the press, none of the previous summits was truly a success – the assessments of their results varied from "failure" to "utter failure". Over the past few years, Group of Seven did not succeed in putting an end to protectionism in world trade, to regional trade blocs. Economic slumps strained relations among partners, but even booms brought with them new economic conflicts which led to political tension. Unresolved contradictions erupted into trade wars.

Those, however, have been extremely fruitful failures the overall result of which is brilliant. In this world of ours, suffering from poverty, backwardness, lack of freedom and resources, excessive accident-proneness and arbitrary rule of any kind, the seven leading industrialized countries add up to an enviable oasis of development, stability and social security. This needn't be proved to a Muscovite or a Leningrader who get to London, New York or Rome, Paris or Montreal for even as long as a day.

The countries, their cultures and traditions, differ – but the result achieved are equally impressive. There is an indicator which is the sumtotal of all the others – we mean the standard of living. It is practically equal (a difference of 5–10 percent, which looks substantial from the inside, is indiscernible for us) in all those countries, both the winners and losers of World War II, whether they were ravaged by the war or emerged intact from it. They have the same economic and political culture, have all but erased the frontiers between them, and share a common space open to a free movement of people, ideas and capitals.

In the 20th century capitalism has demonstrated a remarkable capacity for meeting the challenges of the times and an enviable skill at self-reforming. The Great Depression of the thirties called into being the first great reformation Keynes-Roosevelt style: upon abandoning old dogmas, capitalism inoculated itself with a huge doze of socialization. In the eighties, the conservative revolutions carried out by Reagan and Thatcher took the opposite course: the two leaders cut short excessive state interference in their respective countries and eliminated the danger of bureaucratic decay by means of the life water of privatization. The institutions of Group of Seven – its summits, above all – can be likened to a skilfully operated high-technology machinery for global regulation. This is an exercise in world government. The fact that the summit has the status of the economic one does not prevent it from discussing purely political problems. What's more, this circumstance testifies to a wide-ranging approach to the problems under discussion, the fundamental nature of the decisions made, freedom from dependence on the political situation.

What is the press displeased with then? Well, it is simply part of its job to be displeased, to agitate society, to concentrate on problems rather than on achievements, to criticize rather than to sing alleluia. It is only a very sick person and a very sick society that seek white lies about their condition. A normal person is interested in a timely diagnosis. As to problems, they are always to be found in a developing organism. After all, by solving old problems we only make way for new ones – this is probably what progress is all about. It is only necessary to make sure that new problems should not emerge before the old ones are solved, otherwise metastases will ensue.

The fact that Gorbachev has had the USSR invited to a session of this select club, invaded its agenda, insisted on new partnership being established in place of old hostility, and gained understanding and consent is a prominent landmark.

A country proceeding in a wrong direction

A guest or an equal participant? A partner or a suppliant? A discussion on the subject makes no sense at all. Our country hasn't the slightest reason to claim admission to the privileged circle. As distinct from the record of brilliant achievent the seven truly developed countries have, despite all their past setbacks and slumps, ours is that of one failure after another. Our foreign debt of 65 billion dollars of which 16–18 billion are to be repaid this year, and 23 billion in 1992, is only an outward manifestation of our bankruptcy. The public purse is empty, and is certain to stay empty because our export trade has collapsed. Our rich country has nothing to offer in the foreign market. What's much worse, it has nothing to offer Soviet buyers, the heroic Soviet people, a new historical community which, however, is not as new as to do without food. This is not even trouble, this is disaster. A planned disaster caused by meticulous economic planning from a strong political centre.

All right, who cares for man, he is just a cogwheel. Our self-appointed leaders have never aimed at equalling the West in the sumptuousness of shop windows and supermarket shelves. The system worshipped gross output and called for overtaking and surpassing America in gross output figures, not in the standard of consumption. That seemed possible, at least in certain ("most important", of course) lines of production. But here is a figure from an editorial of *The Times*: "The Soviet Union would rank only about seventh on any realistic estimate of its GNP, roughly between Britain and Italy." Attention great-power status worshippers: not second, as once alleged and believed to be true, but seventh, and not per capita of the population and not for the population at all. Considering that the seventh place is an average derived from the first place in tanks and a two-digit place in cars and

The Seven offers us an umbrella?

computers, there is only one name for this achievement – Failure.

In the world of developed and developing countries our homeland has, alas, the dubious honour of having founded the "Fourth World" – the world of non-developing countries. Or, what's worse, we are a country which has been developing in a wrong direction. Generations have been building communism. Or an empire. And now we have to pay for that.

Will they give us money or won't they, and how much won't they give us? Just name the figure, and it will be too small, whether it is 100 or 150 billion German marks, dollars or pounds sterling... Only where all this money will come from in a situation where the demand for capital in the Western market exceeds likely supply. And the most important thing is that in its present state the Soviet economy is in no position to digest any sizable investments.

"Help!" the Soviet command-administrative economy yells, its former vain pride forgotten. "Help for your own sake because if we disintegrate the miasma of our putrefaction will suffocate the world!" Nevertheless, no one will help this system to survive. It is simply impossible to help it. At one time, the Almighty Himself tried to give it a hand. In the seventies He used the oil crisis shock to toss as much as 180 billion dollars to Brezhnev and company. Where is this money now? Vanished into thin air, into the black holes of the mismanaged economy. After that gift from heavens our economy has only become weaker and more dependent. But for it, perestroika could have come earlier, perhaps. And society would have drunk the bitter cup to the dregs much earlier, too.

Pavlov, Yavlinsky, and sherpas

Gorbachev sent heralds ahead of him with a message saying that perestroika which he had started six years ago and which brought dramatic changes on the world scene – an end to global confrontation, freedom to the peoples of Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany – was entering its decisive stage. The reformation of the economic basis was beginning. Production which took instructions from Red commanders and which catered to the leaders and to the ideology to be imposed, was about to give way to a market-oriented economy, i.e. an economy catering to the consumer and geared to human needs. The good news took the shape of a 23-page message to the leaders of Group of Seven. The confidential nature of the letter immediately provoked worldwide guesswork as to what was behind the "Gorbachev plan". The name "Pavlov" made one suspect that whether the plan worked or not, one would be robbed anyway.

Pavlov was represented in London by his deputy Vladimir Shcherbakov who, most appropriately, told newsmen that 400 Soviet munitions plants making all kinds of items ranging from aircraft engines to firearms and armoured personnel carriers were to be fully converted to civilian production. With a disarming smile, he evaded the question of what proportion of the defence industry that amounted to, and added with a meaningful air that up to 80 percent of the military-industrial complex would be reconversed, although to varying extents. He tactfully suggested the idea of setting up a special convertible ruble fund worth 10–12 billion dollars "which you need more than we do" with a view to enabling Western businessmen to take their profits out of the USSR without difficulty. Shcherbakov did not let newsmen get himself involved in ideological disputes. The Pavlov cabinet, he said, had no priorities other than economic ones, and no ideological taboos or opponents. Except, of course, other economists, especially Western and pro-Western ones, who have the nerve of putting forward their own, allegedly more radical plans for market transformation. At this point, Shcherbakov's voice became metallic, with slightly cannibalistic undertones: those theoreticians are simply ignorant of our realities and in general, "it is always more convenient to experiment on another nation."

There is no doubt that the leaders of our economic system belong to a different school. They prefer to experiment on their own nation. But do they really know our realities – the situation in the country, the people's morale? Do they know how tired, irritated and impatient the people are? If they do, where have they been all these years, why have they been marking time even in the perestroika period?

For all the distinctive national specifics, economic laws, unless they are interfered with, work in a uniform way in the USA and Chile, in South Korea and Hungary. The social and political consequences of their operation have to be foreseen, of course, and this is where politicians come in. All the rest should be left to economists.

Western economists know all about the free market economy, which we are bound for. As to our "marketeers," it looks as if they only know how difficult it is to go market. And as one hears their endless admonitions against touching our planned economy (they argue that the West also resorts to planning, but fail to mention the difference between our kind of planning and theirs), one cannot help suspecting them of the intention to change from marking time to running on the spot.

Yavlinsky did not go to London, either – at the eleventh hour he had to cancel his flight booking and to stay in Moscow for "private reasons." That was a disappointment, and it gave food for speculation. Was Yavlinsky displeased by his plan hav-

ing been crossed with Pavlov's programme alien to it? Were the memories of the fate of Shatalin's and his 500 Days programme too fresh? Or did he doubt that the "Gorbachev plan" would prove to the seven leaders' liking and providently decided to play safe and to distance himself from it?

The word "summit" is part of the English political vocabulary, which is much more colourful than our bureaucratic Esperanto. How are we to refer to those who help leaders climb to that summit like the Nepalese porters of genius no Hymalayan climbing exhibition does without? Sherpas, of course! The leaders' trusted representatives do delicate and painstaking preliminary work. For instance, Nigel Wicks, the British "sherpa," was Mrs. Thatcher's principal private secretary; Anne Lauvergeon, 31, the French "sherpa," is deputy head of the Elysee secretariat. In the Soviet team, this function was discharged by Yevgeny Primakov and, probably, Vladimir Shcherbakov.

As regards Yavlinsky, let us voice another hypothesis: he just didn't want to be a "sherpa." Do not reproach him for that. Too few of those who surround our leaders have the courage of their convictions.

Could things take a different turn?

Idle rumours are best dispelled by facts.

On that main day of the London Summit, journalists came into play rather late. The "sacrament" took place behind closed doors, and we waited. First, on the vast emerald-green lawn, a part of a royal park, which, by a royal gesture, had been allocated to the US Ambassador and where the Soviet and US Presidents made their sensational decision. The decision was announced in a succinct manner, whereupon the press conference was closed. We needed details, therefore we showered Ignatenko and Fitzwater with questions about who, where and when had found the final technical or political solution to the "payload" problem – the solution, without which the nine-year discussions of the strategic arms reduction treaty would have lasted interminably. Was that solution found by the leaders themselves? By the Foreign Ministers? The Chiefs of Staffs? Experts? In London? In Moscow? In Washington? An intriguing phrase was overheard that the solution had been found at 13 hours 12 minutes. Whatever that means, let us remember that at 13:12 Greenwich Mean Time on July 17, the long-awaited baby – the treaty which is to reduce the arsenals of the most monstrous weapons on earth, by about a third – was born.

Thank God!

Having crossed ourselves, let us ponder over the unusual and unpredictable way in which two different contexts of events – everyday and historic – overlap at such moments. In the everyday context, everything is vague and uncertain, and the solution might have never been found. The Treaty would not have been ready for signing yet. The Moscow Summit would not have been announced. And the London meeting might have taken a different course.

On historical plane, such a fortuity is impossible. Dragging the worst legacy of the Cold War to the new epoch of interdependence and partnership? Unthinkable. And so the legacy was done away with.

One can wishfully philosophize, of course, on the subject vital problems being solved only upon getting out of date. That various interests, selfish at times, rather than reason, reign supreme for years.

We all remember that quite recently the prospect of signing the treaty was blocked by our more conservative military and that Eduard Shevardnadze, an uncompromising advocate of accord with the West, resigned in protest. The military triumphed to such an extent that they were even instructed to negotiate with Baker and Bush themselves – Gorbachev sent General Moiseyev to Washington in a hurry. Were the military given a free hand? Not at all, they have lost a chance to juggle with tanks and, at the same time, to fulminate against the diplomats, who conduct negotiations, for undermining the nation's security.

Now they had to answer the Americans' direct questions themselves and to bear full responsibility for the treaty negotiations being deadlocked. And everything clicked into place.

All these intrigues are commonplace and will remain such. What matters from the viewpoint of history is that the Treaty has been agreed upon at long last, and is to be signed in Moscow shortly. The promise has been fulfilled.

Then we waited at the press centre for the key meeting of the seven leaders with Gorbachev to end, and for Gorbachev and Major to come out. The result of the meeting surpassed all expectations. The "Gorbachev plan" did not come under critical fire, and his clarifictions were taken in an extremely well-wishing way. The Western leaders guaranteed the USSR the cooperation of international economic institutions – the International Monetary Fund (associated membership in it, to begin with), the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. They offered their technical help in the defence industry reconversion, food distribution, in solving the nuclear security and transport problems. The "seven plus one" relations are now systematized. The chairman will be visiting the USSR once a year. Finance Ministers will hold regular consultations... However, no astronomical checks were drawn.

In the historical context, it couldn't have been otherwise.

The West will not give a penny for maintaining the spirit or the body of bankrupt socialism – the very idea of it is absurd. The West will render any assistance we need to transform our socio-economic system into something compatible with the Western one, and will keep a close eye on every successive stage of the process. Call it what you like: a transition to the free-market economy, to capitalism or to time-tested general laws of civilization. The West really needs this. But we need this more than the West does. We shall never be able to climb out of the black hole single-handed. We have already tried to build socialism in an individual country.

Moscow: time for deeds

The London Summit commanded a view of global all-human horizons. Where did they get to in Moscow?

The generals have entrenched themselves in their country villas as if the latter added up to Moscow's last line of defence. The Party, prepared to expel its leader for him having been awarded a Nobel Prize, is stubbornly drawing up another utopian programme which, judging by the actions of the Lithuanian comrades, will be carried out underground. The collective and state farms have launched another harvesting campaign which is bound to end in failure. Politics – this exciting sphere of activity, new to Soviet society – is in its primary political capital accumulation stage marked by sheer savagery. Numerous ethnic, economic and everyday problems are heaping up and erupting into conflicts, like mines.

Just try and view things in their historical context under the circumstances!

There is no turning back for Gorbachev. He was equal to the occasion in London. Now he is to prove to the nation, which is tired of words and hungers for deeds, that what has been achieved there has directly to do with evreyday life. And he must move further. A declaration was made in London. Practical work must start in Moscow.

The promise made by perestroika is now becoming clear. Getting back to common sense – how simple it sounds and what a long way we are still to go.

LONDON–MOSCOW

The road through NATO: a trap or a chance?

The past, present and possible future of the North Atlantic alliance

Soviet military experts and the general public are disquieted by the break-up of the Warsaw Pact. They fear that the USSR has come face to face with "the aggressive imperialist North Atlantic bloc." However, they forget that our country was already in this situation before. The North Atlantic alliance was founded in 1949, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1955. Nevertheless, no one attacked the Soviet Union in those years.

It became clear in recent years that "the defensive fraternal alliance" of Warsaw Pact states was merely a decoration covering up the military presence of the "elder brother" in adjacent territories. It is frightening to think how the "junior brothers" would behave in the event of war if even in times of peace the USSR had now and then to suppress the most obstinate allies who did not want to accept the barrack-type model of socialism. When Moscow announced it would pull its troops out of East European countries, the "unbreakable alliance" fell apart like a house of cards.

It has also become clear that NATO is not an "aggressive" and "imperialist" military bloc, but rather a political alliance of industrial states of Europe and North America interested in their stable economic development and therefore opposed to all potential risk factors capable of upsetting stability. Until recently, and perhaps even today, the Soviet Union has been the main risk factor. Anyhow, after the numbers of most destabilizing conventional weapons (tanks, heavy artillery and aircraft) had been compared at the Vienna talks, it turned out that fears over NATO's "offensive character" were grossly exaggerated.

The Soviet Union had superiority in all types of these weapons. The disposition of NATO's conventional armed forces did not allow either to describe it as an "aggressive bloc." In this respect the alliance was interior to the Soviet Union, which had concentrated powerful tank forces on the territory of its allies during the Cold War.

However, fears over NATO's "offensive character" exist, and there is no getting away from them immediately, even if they are merely psychological. The question is how to overcome these fears in a painless way.

Some call for an immediate dissolution of NATO. This suggestion is not real and, most likely, does not serve our interests, because whatever one can say about the Atlantic alliance, it ensures stability much needed during the unpredictable period of transition from blocs to common European structures of security. Moreover, NATO is a sort of bridle for Germany, which will energetically strengthen its political and economic positions in Europe in the near future.

It should be admitted that the calls of our ultra-patriots often have a reverse effect. The louder they shout about the need for dissolving NATO, the more the advocates of this bloc are persuaded that it should be preserved to take no risks. For similar calls indicate that many people in the Soviet Union are guided by stereotypes of the confrontation model of the former "bipolar" world. Even if our leadership is seriously intent on having NATO dissolved, it will have to reckon with the stubborn fact that none of the European countries, East European included, want the alliance to break up. There are no objective or subjective prerequisites in Europe today for abolishing NATO or dismantling its basic political and military structures. This fact alone makes us think about how to accept the reality, but not oppose it in vain.

Incidentally, calls for an immediate dissolution of NATO remind me of political slogans we heard last year: "German reunification must not be allowed" or "Germany's membership in NATO is not acceptable to us." Incantations of this kind were then interpreted in Europe as Soviet attempts to threaten the departing train with the fist. This, naturally, put the USSR in a ridiculous position. Why repeat past mistakes?

It is also said that from now on security should rest not on blocs, but on common European structures. It should be built through an expansion of the CSCE process. This point is hard to dispute. A common European home is a wonderful idea. But how to realize it? There are plenty of slogans, but no workable plans. We should remember the evident fact that a pan-European idea can be realized only in a homogeneous world, that is, a common political and economic space with its democratic component. The basic question is how to build such a world. A homogeneous world is impossible to build overnight. It will be a gradual process lasting for decades. At present we are unable to fit into a common European home, because we are unable to introduce proper order and organize a common economic and political space in our own country.

It should be remembered that a firm establishment of the process initiated by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will also take considerable time. A European United Nations is likely to appear as a result. It may have all external attributes of the collective security system, but will exist mainly on paper.

Why, then, destroy the well functioning mechanism of security provided by NATO? Perhaps it will be reasonable to adapt this mechanism to new conditions, to use it as the foundation for a common European home. In other words, to make NATO an all-European structure.

Some may object by arguing that NATO is a product of the Cold War and that it must die a natural death in the post-confrontation period. I am not going to dispute this point. But this "death" needs time to take place. It will not be an exaggeration to say that this process has started. Today the North Atlantic alliance differs from what it was yesterday. The political aspects of its activity have noticeably strengthened at the expense of military ones. Certain positive changes have taken place in the area of reduction of troops and armaments, the revision of the structure and disposition of armed forces and of the military doctrine, the lessening of the frequency of military exercises, and cuts in the military spending of the member states.

All these facts reflect the tendency towards the depolitization of NATO and its rather fast evolution into a qualitatively new organization with its policy centred

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

on the outside world. It is clear that as the situation in Europe and the world changes and the centre of global contradictions shifts from East-West to North-South relations, NATO will continue to change too.

It is not concealed in NATO, of course, that the USSR with its unstable internal situation is one of the potential risk factors for the alliance. However, NATO's main concern today is not how to oppose the Soviet Union, but how to adapt the bloc to new political realities, taking into account primarily "non-European " risk factors, which have gained priority lately, and simultaneously reducing its confrontation with the USSR. It is for this purpose that NATO is now raising rapid deployment forces and planning new big cuts (by half as the minimum) in its armed forces stationed in Central Europe and is going to make them part of multi-national forces.

NATO has given up the doctrine of a frontal disposition of forces ("forward-line defence") and is modifying its "flexible response" doctrine. The revised doctrine excludes the possibility of using nuclear weapons in the early stage of a hypothetical conflict in Europe and provides for using them only "as a last resort." NATO leaders also manifest an evident desire to promote broad contacts between the Soviet Union and the headquarters of the bloc.

The general impression is that NATO is trying to make the USSR believe that it has not become isolated after the break-up of the Warsaw Pact. This explains, particularly, the firm line of major NATO countries in relation to our former Warsaw Pact allies. All their attempts to get into the NATO structure by any means are dismissed. The main reason is, in my opinion, that the NATO countries do not want to give our conservatives grounds to assert that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact has automatically expanded the zone of NATO's responsibility by shifting the former confrontation line to the Soviet borders.

Moreover, it is hinted from time to time that under certain conditions the Soviet Union will be able to take part in NATO. Soviet military officials are already invited to meetings of NATO bodies. It has been suggested that the two parties exchange cadets of military academies, conduct joint research and so on. In the future, NATO and Soviet troops could held joint exercises, and Soviet troops could also take part in NATO's multi-national security structures, rapid deployment forces in particular. I think we should not ignore NATO's approaches; nor should insist on the dissolution of the bloc if we hope to receive aid from its member states. It will be unreasonable and even dishonest.

Perhaps we should discard ideological stereotypes and think of how to build collective security by making use of NATO's present political structures. In practical terms, it would mean that the USSR enters into an agreement with NATO on cooperation in the maintenance of security in Europe, North America and the Soviet Union, and declares its readiness to participate in NATO's structures of coordinating the various political interests of its member countries.

The USSR could become an associated member of NATO, the more so that the North Atlantic Treaty does not contain provisions unacceptable to us. The documents on military integration, doctrines and other provisions were adopted later and have no direct bearing on political cooperation. It should also be remembered that in the 1950s, the Soviet Union tried to apply for NATO membership on two occasions.

This way of putting the question is unusual, of course, and it is not easy to accept. I think, however, that the potential merits of such a step will exceed the emotional misgivings, for the military threat to the USSR on the part of the United States and NATO will practically disappear. There will remain only small peripheral threats created by seats of tension in the Third World. Stability and security will increase tremendously.

It is safe to say that the East European countries, as well as neutral and nonaligned nations, and most likely Japan, would not want to remain isolated in such circumstances. NATO as a military and political alliance could in the near future be dissolved in the CSCE process, becoming the structural basis of security for it. As a result, the dilemma – the absorption of NATO by Europe or of Europe by the North Atlantic pact – would certainly be solved in favour of the first course of development.

The road to European, and therefore world civilization, is open today. Whether we like it or not, it lies through NATO. Perhaps it is the only door leading to civilization. It depends on whether or not we will be able to discard ideological and emotional misgivings of the past and use this unique chance given us by history.

Sergei Korshunov

A nuclear trump at the negotiating table

Shall we transfer our nuclear tests to Nevada?

The nuclear interests of the USSR may no longer remain a "bête noire" camouflaged by non-nuclear rhethoric. The discussion is overdue, and if its introduction had been the balanced judgements of political scientists (see, for instance, the column by B.Pyadyshev in the March issue of *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*) the resolute statement of technocrats from the VNIIEF directed it along the line of utterly rationalized conclusions. One might expect a pathetic protest from the "green" or the Soviet Peace Committee as an answer to the article in *NT* issue No. 26, but I am afraid it would have been "a dialogue of the deaf." In my opinion, the most dangerous in the discussion that has begun are categorical and one-sided assessments, this is why in this analysis I will try do my best to emphasize both the inner and the outer aspects of the problem.

Nuclear attributes of a superpower

The adherence to the noble principles of non-nuclear ideals was one of the traditional tenets of Soviet foreign policy. As the Soviet leadership's assurance of its armoured cavalry grew, it boldly declared it would never be the first to resort to nuclear arms. The transition to the new political thinking expanded this principle to the proportions of a non-nuclear peace programme, the triumph of which has been recently mentioned by its author in his Nobel lecture. I do not want to draw banal analogies, yet I cannot refrain from stating that it is somehow akin to the food programme – good intentions fully make up for the complete impossibility of their implementation.



The strategic situation today dictates the necessity of strengthening political decisions with nuclear means. The conclusion of the Paris agreement and the demise of the Warsaw Pact made the Soviet Union face, for the first time in its entire history, the fact of NATO superiority in all components of military potential. The Soviet possession of nuclear weapons levels this superiority and makes it unnecessary to set ideal balance and remove obvious asymmetries. I even will dare assume that exactly this argument of a nuclear "safety factor" may become decisive in ratifying the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in the Union parliament. But even regardless of the outcome of ratification, the factor of nuclear deterrence will enable NATO to plan the reduction of arms much below the limits agreed upon in Vienna as well as allow us to initiate at last the implementation of military reforms.

Naturally, this does not imply the necessity of preserving the nuclear arsenals already in existence. During the cold-war period, both sides became involved in a senseless race of nuclear arms technologies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has unilaterally stopped at least the quantitative aspect of the nuclear arms race while so far there is no assurance that we have done the same, and, frankly speaking, the article by the "nuclear" experimental physicists does not strengthen it. I am under the impression that the Union leadership counts on the beginning of negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and has reserved "the trumps for bargaining," postponing the most urgent measures to reduce nuclear programmes. In an attempt to urge on the negotiations, our propaganda has appealed to the dying anti-nuclear movement in the West. Now we have rather vague perspectives for negotiations as a result of losing pace.

Anyway this does not mean that the solution to nuclear problems is hopelessly bogged down. After the text of the Agreement on Strategic Offensive Weapons is finally settled, the agreed-upon parallel reductions of non-strategic nuclear arms to the minimal limits will provide unique possibilities for the "European Four" to cooperate. The purpose of this cooperation may be not only a new quality of military stability, but also coordination of nuclear programmes and even creation of cooperation structures. It may still seem too abstract, yet the leading Western experts whom no one may suspect of futile day-dreaming, already discuss variants of not only a minimal but of a "cooperation deterrence" as well. Thus the nuclear factor may become not a generator of controversies and suspicions but an important stabilizer of military security structures in Europe.

In addition to political problems (discussed below) there are two categories of obstacles on the path to nuclear cooperation. First, there is the problem of physical destruction of nuclear munitions and warheads, and here I would like to hear the

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

authoritative opinion of the experts from the VNIIEF, including that concerning the possibility of joint technological programmes. Second, the absolute secrecy of information about Soviet nuclear arsenals. NATO experts admit confidentially (although this may turn out to be a mere bluff) that they possess up to 90 percent of that information which poses the question of a new level of openness and trust to both one's partners and one's own public opinion.

One may suppose that if it is possible to solve these problems and the cooperation nuclear structure begins to be created in Europe, it will be increasingly reoriented to repulsion of external challenges. The war in the Gulf with its nuclear and chemical background warrants a serious answer to such challenges. In this situation a menace from the south may be even more dangerous for the USSR than for the West, although we do not need the Middle East oil. The borders of the Union become increasingly penetrable for ethnic, religious, and other impulses of instability, whilst the vulnerability of our southern "underbelly" rapidly grows. It is difficult to forcast whether nuclear weapons may turn out to be a stabilizing factor here, in any case such functions should not be excluded a priori.

Thus the usefulness of nuclear arms for the USSR in the period of transition from a militarized superpower to equal partnership is beyond doubt, but guarantees of external security have their reverse side – a risk of internal instability.

Control over the "button"

The disintegration of the USSR becomes a most serious nuclear danger to Europe now. Hardly anyone may be lulled by the categorical declarations of the Defense Minister to the effect that "under no circumstances will a dragging-asunder of nuclear weapons be admitted." At the same time attempts to stimulate Western aid for perestroika by means of uncanny nuclear blackmail (Russian nuclear riot!) so far have produced results opposite to the desired ones. A possibility of loss of control over the nuclear "button" is deemed so serious that many in the West begin to practically consider the Soviet idea of a non-nuclear Europe as the lesser of two evils.

I wouldn't like, not having A.Kabakov's talent, to engage in drawing apocalyptic scenarios of the appearance amidst the ruins of the USSR of nuclear quasi-states hostile to one another and the whole world. Nevertheless, it is clear that it will be impossible to preserve the Union in the former composition while the formula "9+1" presents no more than an opportunity to solve the problem. While the non-nuclear status of the Baltic republics may be guaranteed, the problem of creation of non-nuclear zones in Transcaucasia as well as in Central Asia should be urgently solved.

The claims of "sovereign states" to control nuclear weapons may be for the time being ignored, but are we prepared to divert the danger of nuclear terrorism? A series of accidents with the most up-to-date weapons systems shows that the probability of a "military Chernobyl" is very high, and in a non-professional army it is impossible to reduce it to an acceptable level. Neither should we ignore the undeniable fact that today the army has become the main source of arms for any kind of "voluntary" military formation, criminal group, etc. No extraordinary protective measures can prevent the possible misappropriation or seisure of nuclear warheads, especially when the latter are evacuated from centres of tension.

The situation may be improved only by immediate and drastic reductions, first of all, of non-strategic arms (nuclear shells, mines, mobile tactical rockets) which are likely to be the most desirable object of possession for terrorists. In principle, we should be prepared for the necessity to place nuclear installations under international control if we lose control of the situation.

Are the arguments in favour of retaining nuclear status compatible with alarmist assessments of the risk? I believe that they are not mutually exclusive – provided there is a realistic and responsible approach to taking nuclear decisions.

One of the most difficult decisions to be made will be the solution of the problem of tests which seem to bother the three experimentors most. This question happened to be at the intersection of internal and external problems. Tests in Novaya Zemlya are unacceptable even for Europe – suffice it to mention the painful reaction to last year's radioactive waste dispersion and the raid of the Green Peace boat. The tests in Semipalatinsk are unacceptable for Kazakhstan. So shall we, probably, transfer our nuclear tests to Nevada?

Pavel Bayev,
Cand.Sc. (History)

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Whose bomb is worse?

Dmitry Zgersky

There is nothing surprising about the Iraqi attempts to fool international commissions charged with the task of finding out whether Baghdad has the capability to build its own atom bomb. It is enough to understand the psychology of the leader who used to think he was the beacon for all good nations, but suddenly was unprecedentedly disgraced before the whole world. The Iraqi children may still be taught to sing, "We'll all die for you, Saddam," but the uprisings in the north and south of the country have demonstrated that there was only one step between devotion and hatred. Those who want to see Israel wiped out have been disappointed in Saddam, but can't see any other hero-leader for the anti-Israeli jihad. The only hope left for Saddam to restore his authority in the Arab world, or at least among most Arab states, is to create at least a primitive atom bomb and to really wipe out Israel. Saddam does not seem to be discouraged by the fact that Palestinians will die in this case, too and, probably, the resulting war will take the lives of many Iraqis: you can't make an omelette without breaking the eggs. As for Saddam's personal bomb shelters, they are extremely reliable.

At the peak of the Gulf War I received confidential information that Iraq was busy gathering radioactive dust in uranium-enrichment centrifuges to drop it on Israel (and Palestine, of course). At some point these efforts were stopped and the decision was made to transfer the radiological weapons to nuclear ones, in absolute secrecy. CIA information has it that ten secret plants are working somewhere in the mountains of Iraq and that Iraq has already accumulated forty kilos of enriched uranium.

The sources of Iraq's nuclear potential have been revealed. At the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, Iraq purchased 250 tons of uranium-rich mixture from Brazil, Portugal and Niger. Over 200 companies from Europe, Asia and the USA have supplied Iraq with materials and technologies which have enabled Baghdad to start its own nuclear programme.

International experts believe, however, that it will take five to ten years before Iraq will be able to produce nuclear munitions.

This may be a dangerous delusion. For Saddam Hussein the A-bomb is not simply an ambitious project, but an urgent necessity. According to some sources, the war in the Gulf interrupted Iraqi efforts for the creation of an A-bomb two weeks before their expected completion. The only hope now is that the world community has not stepped in too late.

The Security Council Resolution 687 of April 3 of this year, which Saddam Hussein agreed to honour, instructs Iraq to place all materials that can be used for the production of nuclear weapons under the exclusive control of the IAEA.

Iraq did not fulfil its commitments fifteen days or three months after it agreed to honour the resolution. The international commission was barred from inspecting nuclear facilities, false documents were presented, and some hardware was hastily moved elsewhere. Already defeated, the Iraqi regime continued to resist "the imperialist intrigues." The United States is contemplating a military operation to destroy the Iraqi nuclear facilities in case Iraq does not stop playing games with the international community. Meanwhile, international experts are finding new nuclear facilities in Iraq.

It is easy to imagine the helpless rage and humiliation of Saddam's proponents in the Arab world. Rage and humiliation, by the way, are the very moderate price paid for the crimes the Iraqi regime committed against other Muslims. Whatever condemnations of the "American aggression" and "atrocities of US invaders" might be heard, one has to recall the glad smiles of Iraqi soldiers when they surrendered to the Americans. They knew they were dealing with civilized people and that according to international law they would soon return to their native country well fed and well rested in captivity. At the same time, volumes can be written about the regime's crimes against the Kuwaitis, the Kurds, the very Nature in the region. From the point of view of human morality, the two levels of civilization just do not meet. The result is logical: someone has no alternative but to envy and to hate, others have to be vigilant, making sure the evil forces do not harm mankind any more. An inferiority complex is the source of many crimes.

Iraq's nukes: let's hope the UN has not stepped in too late

Saddam's friends are indignant about the fact that the UN is not taking measures against Israel which has a lot of nuclear bombs. It is obvious that Israel's nuclear potential will continue to be the catalyst of the attempts at building an Arab nuclear arsenal. This is bad. It is also bad that this country has so many nukes. If Zhirinovsky ever becomes president and, true to his promise, abolishes all nationalities except Russian in the USSR, the inevitable civil war will soon become a nuclear one. However, as long as we remain a civilized nation, we can feel safe. We would not feel as safe, however, if a Saddam-like dictator got his hands on nuclear weapons. As for Israel, one can state that it has never initiated unprovoked aggression. It was either forced to attack (1956), or made to become the first to strike (1967), or had to retaliate (1982), or had to defend itself (1948, 1973). But not once did Israel attack for the sheer sake of attacking, as Saddam did.

After the bellicose Iraqi regime is neutralized, it will become possible to discuss Middle Eastern nuclear disarmament under strict international control. ■

Tell me who your enemy is...

Gennady Ariyevich

Rediscovering old truths

It is both sad and amusing: Russian speech is heard everywhere in the streets of any Israeli city or village. If things continue to go on like this, soon the official inscriptions on road signs and other announcements, now written in Hebrew, Arabic and English, will have to be complemented by the Russian translation, too. The first schools and colleges with instruction in Russian have already appeared in Israel. A friend of mine was guiding me along the streets of Tel Aviv, showing me around his native city. We came to the quiet Nakhalat Bendjamin Street with its yellow round street lamps, white tables of numerous cafes and rich vegetation. A group of people was coming towards us engaged in a lively discussion. "These're Russians, too," my friend told me in a whisper, but his words were heard nonetheless. "Why Russians," challenged one young woman, "We are Jews!"



The Wall of Wailing and the Omar Mosque

How much it is to become a Jew

Israel may easily be the only country in the world where the word "Jew" resounds proudly. Israel is the country of Jews and for Jews. The love for Israel and the concern for its wellbeing is easily felt in all words and deeds of the Israelis. The nation is consolidated.

However, is this consolidation not simply a disguise for vulgar chauvinism? Isn't the belief in the Jews being "the chosen people" simply another manifestation of arrogance towards other nations? I do not think so. Anyhow, during my one-month stay in Israel I did not once encounter any instance of arrogance or contempt. Even speaking about their traditional enemies and historical brothers, the Arabs, about terrorist attacks and murders committed by Palestinians in Israel, the Israelis sounded bitter, not hateful or arrogant. However, the feeling of danger coming from the Arabs – which is an important consolidation factor – is fed not only by actual terrorist attacks and murders, but also by the official propaganda. There is a law that prohibits the Israelis from any contacts with the PLO, and this law is causing more and more protests in the country. Aibe Nathan, formerly a famous pilot, spent a month on a hunger strike protesting the law.

I do not want to be misunderstood. I am not presenting Israel as the ultimate example of racial tolerance. Israel is a Judaic state. There are not very many religious fanatics in Israel. The old enmity between the Ashkenazi (Jews of European descent) and Sephardi (Jews of North African descent) has long ended. The only difference between the native population (sabras) and the newcomers (olim) now is the deep roots and better living standards of the former. At the same time, however, orthodox approaches dominate everyday life. Endless heated debates continue at the Knesset about who can be considered one hundred percent Jewish. People who do not follow the Judaic way of life may find life more difficult than those who do. A child will never be registered as a Jew if the mother is not a Jew. This means that in the future, the child will feel morally depraved: he will not be able to enroll in the school he likes, his schoolmates will tease him as some Soviet schoolchildren tease Jews, he will not be allowed to serve in the army, he will never become a minister, and may never be able to marry the girl he loves...

Women have only one option to protect their children from this grim prospect – to adopt Judaism. Not all Israelis are deeply religious, there are many men wearing the traditional black costumes, but they are by no means the majority. However, the religious factor is very strong. Many documents specify not the nationality, but religion. All traffic, including that of public transport, disappears from the streets and prayers are heard from homes and synagogues from Friday noon to Saturday sunset. The districts populated by orthodox Jews close up, and chains and gates separate them from the rest of the city. It is forbidden to turn on the lights and electric appliances, to start up a car engine, to play football, etc.

One local story tells about how in the 1950s, the Americans sent their state-of-the-art F-15 fighters. The pilots were delayed, and the planes arrived fifteen minutes after the Sabbath began. This touched off a government crisis, because religious factions in the Knesset raised the question of no confidence in the cabinet. The aides of the Soviet

They need no arms now, but...

Foreign Minister, who planned Alexander Bessmertnykh's visit, short as it was, for Friday, must have been uninformed about this instructive story.

Non-Jews, Muslims, Christians, Druzes and others make up a little bit more than 18 percent of Israel's 4.5 million population. Different religions manage to coexist – 76 different faiths are represented in Jerusalem, but the Judaic clergy and the government of Israel are carefully protecting the purity of the Judaic faith. In particular, the Israeli government is concerned with the growth of the non-Jewish segment in the country's popoulation. Rumour has it that on the Moscow black market, a Soviet passport stating the bearer's nationality as "Jewish" retails at the highest prices. Last year, over one third of the 200,000 Soviet immigrants who arrived in the Promised Land turned out to be Russians or other Soviets.

The historically understandable concern for the purity of the Jewish race can be easily compared with fascism or racism. Besides, there are many extremists in Israel. However, one can hardly call Israel a racist or fascist state, despite occasional instances of discrimination on ethnic grounds.

A flower bed on the asphalt

Israel is a narrow stretch of land along the eastern shore of the Mediterranean – 450 kilometres from the Golan Heights in the north to the Elath Gulf in the south and 134 kilometres in the widest place between the Dead Sea and the Mediterranean, the crossroads of three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa. It has practically no natural resources or fresh water. The pioneers who arrived in the Promised Land at the beginning of this century had to make titanic efforts to recultivate arable lands from marshes and deserts, to plant trees on steep mountain slopes and to build cities which now have abundant rich vegetation and flowers. Today too much money and effort is spent to weaken Israel's dependence on international markets, to reduce the necessity of importing raw materials, machines, consumer goods, grain, meat and sugar, to economize water. Water is growing more and more expensive, special water counters are installed in houses, and there are rigid limitations on the use of water, especially for swimming pools and watering of gardens. A person who overspends the regular ration of water has to pay an exorbitant fine. It is impossible to imagine a water supply failure or a malfunctioning piece of plumbing in Israel – any failure is fixed immediately.

Another vitally important factor is the hostile environment and the danger of destruction.The statements about the necessity of wiping out Israel are by no means the only source of fear. During the recent Gulf War, Iraq launched Soviet-made Scuds against the civilian popoulation of Haifa and Tel Aviv in an attempt to provoke another anti-Israeli jihad of Arab states. The never ending confrontation makes Israel to be vigilant, seek new business and trade partners because of the neighbours' boycott and the restricted domestic market, and maintain a state of stand-by alert in the country, spending a serious share of material, intellectual and human resources on military needs.

Two soldiers – a young man and a woman, were kissing carelessly at a Tel Aviv bus stop. They had submachine guns and backpacks with them. Servicemen on leave, berets under shoulder straps, can be seen in any Israeli city. Even on leave they have to carry their weapons with them. Sometimes an Uzi submachine gun looks incongruous in the hands of a young girl, but she carries the gun with an air of dignified duty and confident experience. This is a usual sight. The Israelis are used to security guards searching bags and packs outside theatres and supermarkets, never hesitating to destroy a lost piece of luggage. Terrorism and the tense situation which is almost unnoticeable in every-day life (people are too used to it) make these measures necessary.

In Jerusalem, we lived in the quite comfortable and prosperous district of Baka. A flower bed was hastily laid on the asphalt near our house in memory of three Israelis killed on that spot by a Palestinian terrorist.

In these conditions Israel aspires to become a strong power, to bring the long-suffering Jewish nation – scattered all over the world by life and history – to the small patch of land gripped in the Arab fist, to concentrate the entire vital potential of the Jewish nation on ancient Biblical soil.

This is actually the essence of Zionism – the return of Jews regardless of the colour of their skin, to Mount Zion in Jerusalem. After it appeared at the end of the last century as a national-liberation movement, Zionism has evolved through several stages. Like any nationalist ideology, Zionism incorporates various trends, including reactionary ones. This country's attitude towards Zionism started changing as Israel began growing increasingly pro-American shortly after its establishment in 1948. Few people in this country are familiar with the history of Zionism, but the opponents of Zionism are never in short supply here. As a result, the very word "Zionism" has become a synonym for fascism. Some time ago the famous Soviet writer Yuri Bondarev wrote in a *Pravda* article that Zionism was "the worst variety of

fascism" (Implying, obviously, that Nazis had been better). To equate every Jew to a Zionist is complete ignorance.

"Any Jew, wherever he may have been born or be at the moment," said Uzi Narkis, director of the Jewish Agency Sohnut, "may come to Israel at any time, knowing that Israel is his home where he is always welcome." This is a reality, not propaganda. All immigrants receive Israeli passports and subsistence money right at the airport. They are assisted in finding jobs, housing and language study. Israel needs a workforce for extensive construction, experienced personnel for modern industries oriented towards high-tech products, brains to give a fresh impetus to scientific research, blood to boost the population growth and intellectual potential, and soldiers to beef up the army. The strategic objective is to strengthen the country economically, morally and militarily.

It is widely believed in the Arab world and in this country as well, that Israel wants to become stronger and stronger in order to take action against the Arab countries. Indeed, the Jewish state was often the first to attack. Immediately after it was formed, Israel had to repel the combined aggression of Arab states, although the official interpretation adopted in this country is entirely different. At least three similar Israeli "aggressions" can be mentioned. The oficial position in Israel is that all three attacks were provoked by the Arab side, the economic blockade, military preparations and the general Arab desire to unleash an anti-Israeli jihad to destroy the Jewish state.

It is easy to imagine how difficult it was for the Israeli government to refrain from lashing back at Saddam Hussein when two or three times every night the wail of sirens woke the peaceful Israeli population, warning about Iraqi missile attacks and urging people to put on their gas masks and go to bomb shelters.

Jerusalem's Berlin Wall

The Israelis love their army, are willing to serve, and get very upset if the medical commission finds them unfit for military service.

Naturally, the Israeli army is not free of villains. When I was in Israel, the local press was giving extensive coverage to the case of Col. Yeguda Meir, who faced trial for ill-treatment of Arabs. Driven by the desire to avenge the deaths of Israeli civilians during the intifada, the colonel ordered that the legs and arms of several Arabs be broken in order to teach others a lesson. This fact shocked the country more than the Palestinian terrorist attacks which occur almost every week. Meir was demoted to private and may be expelled from the ranks altogether.

Aggression? What for? The Israelis do not like to waste their material and human potential, it is considered a sin to mix with other nationalities, and people who do not share the Jewish values and traditions are not really welcome. As for the land, Israel has enough of it. It is surprising to see vast expanses of land in that small country.

There may be an objection: Israel has captured and is keeping Arab lands, showing no intention to ever pull out. This is correct. The right-wing parties and the Likud Party insist that no concessions be made to the Arabs. Endless debates are goig on in Israeli society and at the Knesset on this score. Most people whom I talked to – the architect Gabriel Yachil, writer Rina Litvin, the kibbuts worker Joseph Porat, Haifa Mayor Arie Gurel, and many others – spoke about the necessity of territorial concessions in exchange for the guarantees of peace. The only point on which no one was willing to concede was the future of Jerusalem as one city. It is impossible to return the situation that existed before 1967 and to divide the city with something like the Berlin Wall. Some experts suggest a compromise solution – joint Israeli-Jordanian administration of the city.

The debates about the occupied territories, however, are by no means of a theoretical character. Israel's landscape starts a gentle climb from the flat Mediterranean shore, where 80 percent of the country's population and all the industries are concentrated, and then ascends to the rocky cliffs of Judea and Samaria, behind which lies the Dead Sea, the world's lowermost point – 400 metres below sea level. This creates a specific strategic situation because control over one of the heights allows one to keep an eye on the whole of Israel, all its industries, military facilities, power plants and ports. At the same time, Israeli radar installed on the heights rules out the remotest possibility of a surprise air strike. That is why Israel intends to keep what it calls "the ceasefire line."

"The Palestinian problem, however painful it may be, can be solved," an Israeli colleague told me, "but this is not the main thing. The main factor is our relations with the Arab world, which have reached a stalemate due to the die-hard policies of our leadership." In fact, in the current Middle Eastern impasse, the Arab position appears to be more flexible than the Israeli one.

It is obvious that there can be no Middle Eastern settlement without superpower participation, but even this participation cannot guarantee success, as has been demonstrated by the recent visits of Alexander Bessmertnykh and James Baker. Israel insists on the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Both countries are interested in it, but the Soviet diplomacy's final switch to the values of new political thinking is being hindered by traditional ties with the Arabs and domestic complications which prevented Moscow from assuming a porincipled stance vis-à-vis the Saddam Hussein aggression.

Shortly before he resigned, Eduard Shevardnadze said the Soviet Union was removing all preliminary conditions for the restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel. Now the Soviet Union is putting forth conditions again, though fully consonant with the Washington position.

A rather paradoxical situation appears. Israel demands from the Soviet Union something that the latter is even more interested in. Tel Aviv wants normal contacts and ties which are only starting to develop now, Soviet participation in the making of peace with the Arabs (a middle-man cannot represent one side), and access to the Soviet market (Israel will buy anything from the USSR except weapons). The main thing Israel wants is better conditions for Jews in the USSR and wider opportunities for emigration. Israel can have all this without diplomatic relations. As for Moscow, it could gain much from the restoration of relations, including scientific innovations and technologies, agricultural goods (special subsidies exist in Israel to prevent the farmers from producing too much food), and real superpower influence in the region. The indecisive and ill-defined policies will mean an eventual political loss.

TEL AVIV–JERUSALEM–MOSCOW

The World Paper

In this issue contributors to the American World Paper discuss Japan – a country with a unique status as the world's first purely economic superpower

A nation wrestling with itself

Like one of the country's periodic natural disasters – earthquake, volcano, typhoon or tsunami – a national identity crisis has struck the Japanese islands with full force.

Japanese political, business and intellectual leaders are engaged in searching reappraisals of the nation's global standing and status. Does Japan represent the world's first, true, economic-only superpower, is it destined to remain stunted in terms of political growth and international influence?

The country's prime minister, Toshiki Kaifu, asked this very question in a significant foreign policy address in Singapore in early May. "While the Japanese contribution in the wake of the Gulf crisis has been mainly in financial terms, the question posed to us is whether or not we can truly fulfill our responsibilities with financial cooperation alone to ensure the maintenance of peace and stability in the international community."

The question comes at a moment when the luster of Japan's almost unbridled economic success has become tarnished. Observers outside Japan are preoccupied with Tokyo's plunging stock and real estate markets. Those within the country question whether Japan itself is on the verge of financial decline. The following pages feature the views of several key insiders and astute Japan watchers addressing the Zen question: Is Japan's cup half full, or half empty?

An island adrift in a riskier world

While the "new world order" of Mr. Bush refuses to be ordered, Japan, supposedly its paymaster, is having trouble establishing its own identity.

In a case that was almost comically "too little, too late," Takako Doi, leader of the opposition Social Democratic Party of Japan, made a belated plea for her party's pacifist stance on the Gulf War to a gathering of the Japan-US Association in Chicago on May 24.

The first woman to lead a Japanese political party would have provided a better service to her nation and to Japan-US friendship if she had made her plea in the US during the Gulf crisis. Instead, she went to Iraq to make a well-meaning but ultimately counterproductive appeal for peace to Saddam Hussein on the very eve of Operation Desert Storm.

"To play a leading role in the international community, it is indispensable for Japan to make her own decisions on international issues without succumbing to outside pressures," she declared. In Chicago, Doi also accused the Kaifu administration and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party of being reluctant to admit and make up for what Japan did to her Asian neighbours in wartime. "The LDP has always ignored matters that are inconvenient for it," she said. "It is not qualified to play an important role in the international community."

Two days later, a Japanese miniflotilla of four minesweepers and two support ships passed through the Strait of Hormuz and entered the Persian Gulf. This was the first overseas non-training mission of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (Navy) since the Korean War. It was also another case of "too little, too late." As these episodes illustrate, Japan is struggling to define its role in the international community.

Two years ago, things were going far better for Takako Doi and her supporters. Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita had to resign because of an influence-peddling incident, called the "Recruit Scandal," which involved insider trading of stocks. Appointment of Sosuke Uno as the prime minister elicited another scandal, this time involving a geisha. In the following House of Councillors elections, Doi's party increased its strength dramatically.

Meanwhile, the Japanese economy had lost its glitter because of the burst of the "twin bubbles" of inflated land and stock prices. All these phenomena combined to give the impression of a declining and decaying Japan to many overseas observers, as well as many Japanese. But to Doi and her supporters in and out of her party, these simply represented a rectifying process for Japan.

But international developments were encouraging. The Cold War was ending and Germany was being peacefully reunited. Many were glad to feel that Japan, by abandoning war and keeping its military capability to a minimum and achieving economic success, more or less forced the US and Soviet Union to abandon their Cold War mentality and shift their national efforts to economic interests. Many felt Japan was a role model for the future and the only items on the national agenda were to make Japan's economic and political system more fair and enhance understanding and communication with other nations.

And then the Gulf crisis erupted. By invading Kuwait, Saddam Hussein pushed history back to the 1930s. By refusing to withdraw from Kuwait in time to preempt Desert Storm, it looks as if Hussein reminded the Americans (and probably Russians and Chinese, too), the value of military power. And last, but not least, by allowing Hussein to use his remaining tanks and helicopters to suppress the rebellious Shiites and Kurds, George Bush showed the world that might is right.

Now that the world is looking more like a stormy ocean full of ethnic strife (except for an island of internal non-belligerence which happens to be the North Atlantic community), Japanese pacifism is subdued. Nationalist and ultranationalist elements, prodded by US Japan-bashers, are again clamoring for a revision of the Constitution, especially for abolition of Article 9 which renounces the use of military force as a means of national policy.

Enthusiasm for international communication and contact has also been somewhat subdued because of intensifying friction with the US and EC and the gigantic influx of Asian immigrant workers, many of them illegal. Anticipating EC 1992 and the North American Free Trade Zone, there is growing talk of establishing a Japanese-led East Asian economic bloc. But, ironically, many of those who are keen to have such a bloc are those who object to freer entry to Japan of citizens from those Asian nations.

Politically and socially, one can say that Japan is in a confused state, drifting in the turbulent sea of international relations. Economically, though, it is still not doing too poorly because Japan's economy seems to thrive on being bashed and its people are used to voluntary belt-tightening.

Japan's per capita Gross National Product, which was US$23,730 in 1990 World Bank statistics, is third after Switzerland and Luxembourg. But if you compare per capita floor space of newly built houses, Japanese homes only have 60 percent of the space of houses in the US. By the same token, per capita office space is 40 percent less than in the US. Washington, D.C., has 416 square meters of parks per capita, which is 167 times that of inner Tokyo.

Many Japanese would like to see a Japanese New Deal before the country ventures into anything like a Japanese version of the Marshall Plan. Yet, because Japan became an economic superpower almost in spite of itself, most realize that Japan should contribute to the economic well-being of the world.

Most Japanese believe they can make a valuable cultural contribution to the world. Indeed, Japan started rebuilding itself after the war vowing to become a "nation of culture."

Would Japan like to be a "full superpower," with dominating political and military clout like the US? Hopefully not, because most of its people and all of its Asian neighbours would not like to see this happen.

Though appearing quixotic for now, hopefully Doi and other Japanese pacifists are still on the right track, and a real "new world order" is on its way; a world where every nation volun-

The Soviets have an appetite for good ideas



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In that sense, the cup will never be full for any nation, at least in the present sense of the nation state. If an American asks, "Is Japan's cup half full or half empty?" one would reply, "Half full, of course, for we started with half empty in 1945. But half full is going to mean full to every nation in the real 'new world order.' Will you Americans be satisfied with half full then? Won't you cry out that it's half empty?"

Akiyuki Konishi

Tokyo, Japan

Pax Nipponica's way of the merchant

From control of Java's natural resources to Hollywood's cinema gems, Japan's global expansion is being propelled by the same forces – commercial, industrial and technological – that fueled its stunningly rapid emergence as an economic superpower in the 1980s, and which have left its domestic economy robust.

On the other hand, its superpower status is distinctly not political, ideological or cultural. Japan has not exerted formal political control over any nation, it has fought no war for 46 years and currently has no military capability or presence beyond its borders. Nor does it currently appear to espouse any evangelical universal ideology which would be sufficiently influential abroad. Yet, there are new whispers that Pax Nipponica is about to complement, or possibly supplant, Pax Americana.

Hermetically sealed to the outside world for over two centuries, Japan was rudely awakened by the Western imperial powers in the mid-19th century. As the Western powers marched through South and Southeast Asia, humiliated China in the Opium Wars and menacingly arrived on Japan's shores, the Japanese perceived the phenomenon as that of *seiryoku-tozen* (the inexorable eastward advance of Western powers).

In 1868, a revolution occurred which paved the way for capitalism and industrialism, but which also involved the restoration of the emperor and all the Shinto mythology associated with it. Instead of the capitalist revolution leading to the emerging dominance of bourgeois values, as in Europe and the US, it was the samurai ideology, the *bushido* (way of the warrior), which predominated.

Initially, political power was concentrated primarily in the hands of former samurai. With the government's policy articulated in the slogan *fukoku-kyohei* (rich country-strong army), a formidable modern military machine was established which later came to dominate the state.

While Japan's modern nation-building was initially defensive, nationalistic and reactive, by the late 19th century the country began to carve out its own empire and became offensive, imperialistic and proactive. In the late 1930s, the empire was presented in the form of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, leading to a showdown with the Western powers, the US in particular. By September 1945, the empire had collapsed.

The driving forces of Japan's first empire were obviously partly economic, including the desire to secure access to natural resources and lebensraum for the rapidly growing population.

There was also an element of Pan-Asianism; Japan claimed it was "liberating" fellow Asians from the yoke of Western empires. The ideological buttress was a primitive emperor-worship, cum *bushido* millenarianism. Essentially, however, it was militarist nationalism and left in its wake no cultural or ideological legacy.

In the course of the decades immediately following World War II, the Japanese socio-economic landscape changed virtually beyond recognition. The values that have emerged are preeminently bourgeois, albeit with a Confucian hue. A strong work ethic, a highly developed educational system, thrift, stoicism by day and Epicureanism by night are among the various qualities that have characterized contemporary Japanese society. Periodic attempts by the Ministry of Education to revise school textbooks along more atavistic lines notwithstanding, emperor worship, *bushido* and military-political rule have all been relegated to the dustbin of Japanese history.

As the *bushido* has been eclipsed, the *shonindo* (way of the merchant) has risen in phoenix-like fashion. The Japanese have been exceedingly good at making things, including money, and now stand as the world's paramount economic athletes, still only holding the silver medal but rapidly reaching for the gold. At dusk of the 20th century, economic forecasters – and other soothsayers – herald the imminent arrival of the "Pacific Century" with Japan in the driver's seat.

In the search for international historical precedents to describe Japan's second empire, reference is often made to Pax Americana and/or Pax Britannica, or France's *mission civilisatrice*. The earlier French and British empires and the contemporary American version, have included all the usual accoutrements of imperium in the Roman sense of the term. Power rested not only on economic or military force, but on a perceived superior and universally applicable ideology such as Christianity, democracy, the rule of law, the rights of man, etc. Thus, the concept of Pax Britannica or Pax Americana, derived from the ancient Pax Romana, implies a multidimensional package.

Japan's current global position and weltanschauung might be better compared to that of the earlier Dutch seaborne empire. In contrast to the other European empires, the Dutch model was singularly devoid of evangelical ideology, much less con-

cerned with Christianity than in pursuing the teachings of Mammon.

Similarly, there is nothing that really drives the Japanese in terms of their global role outside of purely commercial objectives. The question is often raised: What, if any, ideology do the Japanese have to offer? But it is an irrelevant question. The Japanese don't have or, apparently, want an ideology on the domestic market, so there is clearly no export potential. In the contemporary Japanese commercial empure, as in the Dutch seaborne empire, the only real "ism" is materialism.

The Dutch, of course, were not all slaves to Mammon. They had a vibrant artistic culture in the Netherlands. The same is true of contemporary Japan and the country's rich cultural life, combining both indigenous and Western elements, which is forgotten all too often. The Japanese do not just make cars and semiconductors. They also make music, films, paintings, literature and architecture – and they also have a lot of fun.

So far as national motivation in international affairs is concerned, as long as the going is good, the Japanese will continue to pursue commercial advantage – as the Dutch did in the past.

As in the case of many other empires, such as the Chinese, Ottoman, British, French and the contemporary American, the waning of their ascending economic trajectories was mitigated by the artificial impulse of faith: a sense of mission, continued adherence to an ideal, the evangelical pursuit of a universal ideology. So far as the Japanese are concerned, since they do not have and do not appear to be interested in these particular cosmetics, once the economic trajectory slows down, the decline of their empire should occur at a much more rapid, indeed evanescent, pace. The Dutch empire's eclipse occurred in a somewhat similar manner.

In the meantime, however, what is less discernible on the horizon is when Japan's economic trajectory will begin to decline. While certain alarmists talk about the country's de-industrialization, any signs of this phenomenon are still very weak. In 1990 alone, investment in new plants and capital will have come to nearly 26 percent of Gross National Product (GNP), and expenditure in research and development to just under 3 percent of GNP. That means Japan has reinvested one-third of its output into its future. No other industrialized nation comes anywhere close to such figures.

So long as the Japanese continue investing and saving at these rates, they will continue to make hay and enjoy the good life to which they are increasingly addicted. Another two decades of sustained economic growth seems a plausible time frame.

While Japan will continue to be one of the powerhouses of the global economy, there will be no Pax Nipponica in the conventional sense of the term. Japan does have a major contribution to make to the world, but it lies and will continue to lie pretty much exclusively within the economic domain.

For the time being, the West, and the US in particular, will still have to be relied upon to provide the ideological model and the geopolitical framework. So long as the Americans and the Japanese can agree on a reasonable division of labor and keep the tensions in their economic relationship within manageable proportions, the more plausible scenario for the foreseeable future is a hybrid Pax Nippo-Americana.

Jean-Pierre Lehmann
Tokyo, Japan

Tokyo trendy

A traditional Japanese dessert simply used to be plump grapes or ripe melon, perhaps accompanied by sweetened rice biscuits. But in today's Japan, those with a sweet tooth can find almost anything they are craving. *Teramisu*, a custard-like dessert sprinkled with chocolate powder, has become popular after the stylish young women's magazine *Hanako* ordained the treat "different" and *oishii* (delicious). Now the rage, companies hoping to capitalize on the sensation are hard at work introducing variations on the theme – *teramisu*-flavoured chocolate, cookies, ice cream, milk shakes, etc.

There's been a growing interest in foods from exotic countries: Thailand, Turkey, Ethiopia and Russia. Although the food could still use some authentic fine-tuning, compared to five years ago it's much improved. But prices are still rather ridiculous.

Everyone is so busy, busy, busy...so, all sorts of foods are currently available, precooked and ready to microwave: soups, curries, spaghetti, noodles and even rice. All are available at 24-hour convenience stores, another imported phenomenon. One company recently introduced a ready-to-eat soup targeted at working women with the slogan SOUP-er WOMAN!

The great outdoors has also come into vogue in Japan. And Tokyo trendies are embracing environmentalism. Concerts and other planned events are held to promote "earch consciousness." FM Tokyo (radio) airs self-promoting advertisements about environmental care and even Suntory Beer has started a PR campaign capitalizing on the trend: "Suntory is thinking about the earth..."

American-inspired log homes have been popping up in more rural areas; the rustic homes evoke a frontier spirit that provides an escape from hectic city life. And for "outdoorsy" women, department stores are introducing a line of stockings treated with insect repellent. The stockings are sold in other fragrances – lemon and various flower scents.

Japanese are also jogging, dancing and lifting in step with the Western fitness craze. Joining a health club is not merely a means of staying fit, but a ticket to vogue, say many Tokyoites. Mountain biking has also become a popular means of staying in shape. Pastel and blinding neon bike accessories and bikewear are stopping traffic all over town. The more colourful, the more popular.

Clubs are in, discos are out. I've not really figured out the difference, but it seems the mere word "club" is cooler. New clubs, such as the Bay Side Club in Yokohama, feature live music, usually by American dance bands which were popular about 10 years ago in the states – the Ohio Players, Midnight Star, etc. Instead of just sitting and listening to the music, the audience can get up and boogie. Still, admission is in the US$35–70 range, which means big profits for club owners and promoters.

Foreigners living in Japan used to have a heyday picking through the *gomi* (trash) the night before the designated trash pickup day because the Japanese dispose of bikes, VCRs and TVs not because they are worn out, but because there is a new and better model available, or because there simply is no space for storage. But now, young and old, men, women and couples are discovering there is money in *gomi*, and are renting tables at Tokyo's flea markets (the first opened in 1980) selling used clothes, telephones, antiques, CDs...

Minoru Akuhara
Tokyo, Japan

New defence for Soviet citizens

From now on Soviet people can make complaints against their state. They will be examined by the Human Rights Committee

There is no longer a need to hold a conference on human rights in autumn because its main purpose has been achieved. The usual Soviet tradition of refurbishing the façade by the arrival of distinguished guests found expression recently in the adoption of long expected laws and the USSR's accession to international agreements which it used to fear like man fears fire.

The foreign ministry has worked out a list of priority steps and the President has issued a decree on measures to bring Soviet legislation in line with the Soviet Union's commitments arising from the documents of the European process. In addition, closed meetings were held and recommendations adopted.

The law on travel was the first major step. In July the Soviet parliament voted for the USSR's joining international mechanisms of control over the observation of human rights. In other words, the Soviet Union has allowed the world human rights community to look into the corners of its house, so to speak, and – though politely and carefully – clean it up a little.

The intention to extend the Soviet Union's participation in international mechanisms of control over the observation of human rights was first expressed by Mikhail Gorbachev at the session of the UN General Assembly in December 1988. It took two years and a half to back up the words with action. During this time departments tried to "stave off" the danger of having to answer for their deeds not only at home but also before the world community. The KGB was the last institution to withdraw its objections. After that the Soviet parliament easily approved the necessary laws (333 members voted for, no one against, and only five abstained). It voted according to the principle: "this must be done."

Back in 1973 the Soviet Union ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, only after the above-mentioned voting in the Soviet parliament can we take part in the procedure envisaged in Article 41 of the covenant. It says that one state can make a complaint against another (more exactly, about the violation of human rights by another) to the Human Rights Committee. Though it sounds menacing, the real danger for those who infringe on laws is purely hypothetical. No state has as yet filed a complaint against another, obviously to avoid diplomatic complications.

The USSR has also withdrawn its objections to Article 14 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. From now on we recognize the right of the Human Rights Committee to examine the complaints of Soviet citizens in case of racial discrimination. An outburst of ethnic problems can make Article 14 topical for the USSR, though it is rarely invoked in other countries. The foreign ministry official I talked with could recall two cases only. A Turkish woman living in Holland complained that she had been dismissed on racial grounds. A Moroccan who is married to a French woman and lives in France expressed his indignation over the refusal of the French college of barristers to admit him as a member. Complaints of this kind are examined for a very long time, and one can hardly expect that the state will be "punished." Most likely, experts from the Human Rights Committee will recommend revising the appropriate legislation.

The Soviet Union has recognized all three procedures of control proposed in the convention against torture and other kinds of treatment and punishment – cruel and inhuman or humiliating the dignity of man. The main thing is that from now on the Human Rights Committee has the authority to consider the complaints of Soviet citizens who believe that they have been subjected to torture or treated cruelly. Two points should be noted here. First, it is not only a matter of obvious facts, say, the beating of an arrested or imprisoned man. One can complain about cruel treatment on the part of the personnel in a children's home or kindergarten, in a mental home or simply in a hospital. Second, the USSR's accession to the international mechanism of control should make it introduce the word "torture" into criminal legislation. In the past, "torture" was considered a word from the Western lexicon which had no relation to our "most humane" system.

The number one achievement is, of course, the USSR's joining the Optional Protocol to the Covenant, which supplements the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. The Human Rights Committee has been given the right to consider complaints against the state from private persons and their representatives. A state which has signed the protocol must send written explanations to the committee and, if the complaint is valid, take measures for restoring citizens' rights.

The protocol specifies that a reply should be sent within six months. If a state has signed the protocol all its bodies, even at the low level, must be ready to substantiate their decisions. It is believed therefore that the accession to the Optional Protocol compels national bodies to work efficiently and reduces the time of consideration of complaints within the country.

The Human Rights Committee accepts complaints only if all national means of defence have been exhausted, that is, if the case was examined by courts of all instances. Thus, it is simply unreasonable to send the complaint immediately to Geneva. However, the complaint will be accepted if its consideration inside the country concerned is delayed unjustifiably.

Soon after the UN Secretary-General takes the Soviet parliament's decision into consideration, all Soviet citizens who think they have been maltreated by the authorities will acquire a new defendant. They can send their complaints to United Nations office at Geneva Centre for Human Rights, Palais des Nations, CH–1211, Geneve 10.

Drawing by Igor Shein

Lev Yelin

HUMAN RIGHTS

Fuzz hut

In the cell for former Interior Ministry personnel

Valery Abramkin, Head, Centre for a More Humanitarian Penitentiary System

Valentina Chesnokova, the centre's sociological researcher

Vladimir Kupriyanov, picture credits

From an interview with Naum Nim

Naum Nim is the pen name of the author of short stories about Soviet prisons and Gulag camps. Arrested for human rights activity in 1985, he was sentenced to thirty months for "circulating wilfully false, slanderous inventions smearing the Soviet state and social system." Freed in March 1987, under the respective edict of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

I was arrested on January 25, 1985. At the time I was 34. For long I cherished illusory hopes that I was the last of the stagnation-chapter dissidents jailed, but later I discovered that there had been some more "lucky ones" after me.

I was immediately deposited in the interrogation block of the Rostov city KGB branch. I would advise anyone wanting to have a good time in prison to go there, as only there I never went hungry and generally led a life of tranquil ease. True, at the outset I fought a minor war, when brought from the library for me were such books as "Caution, Zionism" and "The Face of Imperialism." However, after two of my applications on the score that ended and I was given the books ordered; I must say that their library is wonderful, which I highly recommend.

The prison warders are all noncoms and as

they all take pride in their office and firm, they are exceedingly polite, even ready to come to your assistance, out of boredom no doubt. Thus, when my pipe got clogged up, I'd knock on the door and the warder would clean it for me.

As my diary, confiscated when my home was searched, contained a whole heap of diverse addresses and telephones, the Rostov KGB men quite obviously intended to spend a goodly time with me, ticking off all the names, setting off to the addresses indicated, etc., etc. However, Moscow, unfortunately, ordered them to complete interrogation within the space of four months, and, as a result, I did not have as long a time I could have hoped for in the Rostov interrogation block.

Incidentally, my trial was held in camera, which was quite extraordinary for the article under which I was charged. Indeed **all** political trials, though held behind closed doors, were called "open trials." But my trial was officially closed by the demand of the interrogating officer. I learned later on that in their haste the KGB had been guilty of an absurd blunder. Without bothering to dig deeper, they had qualified a document which amidst the confiscated material, had been listed as "five sheets of handwritten texts," as vicious calumny, though these were actually notes from writings by Marx! It was too late when they found out, as the case had already been referred to the law court. As it was now impossible to make any changes, they decided to have the trial held in camera.

After the trial I landed in the Novocherkassk interrogation block, moreover in the fuzz hut, where former Interior Ministry staffers were held. I was told I had been confined there "for my own safety."

The cell was overcrowded, with but fifteen bunks for the 50 prisoners, so we had to take turns sleeping.

The appearance of every newcomer gave them a delight, with them pretending to be real true underworld criminals. They at once accused the newcomer of being of the fuzz and as a result, got the miserable chap to own up, shed tears, crawl on his knees and participate in sundry "games" of which the least shocking was to guess who was hitting you on the head. Only afterwards did they admit that they were also of the fuzz. One noncom tried to break out of the cell when he learned that everybody there knew he was of the fuzz; he was amazed that the warders outside were laughing their heads off. He abased himself so much so that later he fagged for everyone in the cell. This sort of game was played all the time in the fuzz hut. So when I was pushed in there at night, they tried their tricks on me. However, I disappointed them because I soon suspected something fishy, when men too well fed to be jailbirds sought to play that role.

These prisoners were indeed well fed, even though the meal carriers who shared the overall prisoner contempt for the fuzz sought to pare it down as much as they could. However, as many of my cellmates still had connections from before, they managed to secure additional food.

> Kuzmich, as an "underworld king," maintained that his job was to set up sound, normal procedures wherever he would be

One more curious sidelight was that unlike the ordinary prisoner, they never bothered to read a single book. They spent the entire time daydreaming; in fact, nowhere else did I ever come across such deeply cherished illusions that on the very next day, for instance, everything would change and a prosecutor friend would release them. What tormented them most, as far as I could make out, was whether to peach or not on the men in whom they reposed their hopes. Nearly all had been arrested for bribe-taking, but as their entire system is corrupt, each had a plenty of dirt to retail about those still free. That was their greatest headache. Generally, they could not understand why they had been arrested, while others, as bad as they were, were still free.

What also endlessly amazed me was their juridical illiteracy. They all appended to applications the phrase: "Please do not deny my request." I was obliged to rewrite appeals for many, as they were simply unable to put down their thoughts on paper. The only two who wrote their own appeals were a former assistant prosecutor and a former judge.

However, in this cell there was nothing of the informal pecking order, which prisoners usually maintain. True, there were cases when the physically stronger so-called lower orders came down on superiors. On the other hand, men of higher rank got more in the way of privileges, parcels and the like. Which meant that a balance was struck. As for cell procedures, they were maintained exclusively by the prison administration. Of course, they all peached against one another and it seemed to me that they couldn't imagine any other way of life. Anything would be reported to the administration very same day. This wholesale peaching was, I think, what ruled out the usual type of prison relationships, inasmuch as all human contact there was unreliable and short-lived.

To cut a long story short, I found it increasingly oppressive to be with these men and demanded a transfer to a normal cell. I wanted to see what the real prison world was like, not the endless games and squabbles among the fuzz from morning to night. There was one more motivation, and this was that with the fuzz I intuitively sensed the ambiguity and abnormality of the situation. I felt this could all bring future complications. Which really happened. Indeed, later, when I had a better picture of prison life and its rules, I realized the risks I had run. A sojourn in the fuzz hut is a terrible thing for a prisoner. When transferred to a normal cell, he can expect horrible punishment and will never be able to get rid of the stigma to the very end, with which he will be branded should he be sentenced to a new term.

Which meant that by getting out I avoided many unpleasant things. The more so as when transported from Novocherkassk, no one would have heard me out, as everyone knew I was from the fuzz hut. As it was, I experienced some unpleasantness when transferred to an ordinary cell, after its inmates had learned where I had been before.

At the outset it was like a dumb show, like the finale in Gogol's *Inspector General*. Still, at this highly critical moment I again intuitively adopted the right course. Realizing straight off who was who and whom I should discuss matters with, I chucked my mat under a bench and went straight to the window where the "bosses" sit. In prison generally one

Prisoner amateur art

never discusses things with all the cellmates. The prisoner, who puts questions and speaks is one who maintains he has every right to do so. I also realized that I had to be very short and not quibble. I said I had been pulled out of the fuzz hut, as it was impossible for me to stay there and that I was a political.

They at once exchanged knocked-out messages with other cells to gather the dope on me. Fortunately, in the hospital bay at the time was one Evgeny Kuzmich, an "underworld king," who ordered that I be accepted under normal procedures. That put an end to everything. Later, when we were taken out for the daily walk, I exchanged shouts with Kuzmich and the others with me quietened down not to interfere.

Generally, if not for Kuzmich, I could have found myself in hot water more than once. Once I interceded for a cellmate whom they wanted to "dip," which would have ensured immediate punishment. The second time I again interfered in someone else's affairs, and it was only thanks to Kuzmich that I got away with it.

Only in the ordinary cell did I at once feel the advantage of being charged under a "good" article of the criminal code. I no longer had to sleep on the floor, but could kip out in a bunk even if it was a Box-and-Cox arrangement. After a month spent in the fuzz hut, life amidst the ordinary criminals seemed to present a model of human behaviour. What most pleasantly struck the eye at once was the circumstance that no obscenities were mouthed. This was again the result of Kuzmich's intervention. He told me that his job as an "underworld king" was to at once institute normal sound notions wherever he might be. And he did that. Nobody could utter foul words, all the more so, insult anyone just for the kick of it. That was regarded as a very grave crime. One is held responsible for every word said, implying that communication imposed a definite responsibility on the partners involved. Emotions were out, as only sensible things could be discussed. I think it absolutely right to never accuse anyone of anything you cannot fully vouch for with your own life even.

This was the first time that I found that the word uttered was more important than the meaning it carried. Thus, one could discuss things of extreme importance for all, for instance, an understanding to act conjointly in connection with a curtailed ration. But if anyone imprudently said "Let's do something, let's go on a hunger strike, as your passiveness means you're working – note working – for the fuzz," you'd be called to account for that one word, even though what you otherwise said was absolutely right.

Filching or the outright appropriation of another man's property was not tolerated. You could take something only from one who had consciously or unconsciously – that made no difference – violated the unwritten prison law. Otherwise you were sure to be harshly punished at once.

I remember once in Novocherkassk when several incoming groups of prisoners had all their things stolen, which was an absolutely wrong thing to do. I am still amazed how quickly Kuzmich got to know about it; no doubt some of the prisoners who had things stolen had complained. At any rate, the penalty was immediate. It was terrible, with the "boss" of the cell, whose inmates had stolen these things, being "dipped" that very same day, the moment Kuzmich ordered. As a matter of fact, the poor sod did not even have time to get himself transferred to a "rooster" hut.

I always felt that at the root these "correct notions" were indeed sound and right, that many of the unwritten prison rules were much more in harmony with traditional morality than the rules governing life in Soviet society today.

I think that in spirit these rules – and I have given much thought to that – have nothing in common with Western tradition as much more here is really Oriental, paradoxical.Thus, if you are to put the question: "May I?", there is no point continuing, as you will at once hear "you cannot." In this world a person may do only what he himself thinks conceivable. By the tenor of his life he finds his niche, even though at the outset he may claim what belongs to others; however

gradually everything falls into place. For no man can do more than he can.

I personally have been obliged often to choose what privations I could tolerate and what I would not surrender whatever the circumstances. Thus, when I first entered a hut in a penal colony, I already knew that the newcomer could smoke only outside. Generally speaking, no one can smoke inside a hut, except for a few who see to it that the others abide by the ban. So before I walked up the "boss" corner, I lit a cigarette, in other words, behaved quite differently than is the usual case. Though I was prepared to tolerate much, this was something I could not take, as I am virtually a chainsmoker and would have been most inconvenient to have been restricted in that respect.

Let me put it thus: the prisoner is entitled to say or do anything. Only it is tacitly maintained that he is responsible for everything he does, for every word he says, for every action. That is a basic rule.

It goes without saying that nobody explains this prison code to anyone. That is just not done as it is like the air you breathe. You learn it at once. What can be formulated are only the chief taboos, so that you don't put your foot wrong from the outset. That is something you will always be told. But how can you tell a man not to peach, not to stick his nose into the affiars of others, not to appropriate the property of others?

There is such a concept as a "bent guy." If he hasn't imbibed the spirit of the unwritten prison law with its ethics, he is "bent," which means he is dangerous generally, precisely because of his unpredictable behaviour. He may do anything "bent," for which already you are held responsible, as you should have stepped in to prevent it.

Hence, when a prisoner wants to dodge unpleasantness, he must know what he can expect from any of his neighbours; at the same time, he must fall in line with what others expect of him. Given this high degree of interdependence, the distinct monovalent meaning of what you say, want and do, is of particular importance. If you decide to do something, do it. You can't simply threaten somebody and then go back on your word. Once you utter a threat, even in passing, you've got to do what you say. This is part of the responsibility you bear for what you say. No changes are recognized, no "I did or said it accidentally." That is completely out, as it means you yourself were unable to foresee what would come about. That is likewise a token of unreliability. The basic value in this world is the absolutely self-confident man.

Indeed, in a world where everything is so unreliable, reliability is a treasured value.

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The case of antlers

For the first time ever a Soviet court of law was offered a bail of 100,000 rubles. The judge refused it

Alfred Scholenberg in the dock. No way out?

It happened at the hearings of the case of Alfred Scholenberg, President of Novosibirsk's Progress company, arrested by the KGB in a Molodyozhnaya hotel room, Moscow, last October. Scholenberg was put on trial on charges of smuggling out a large batch of Siberian stag antlers, stealing more than two million dollars and forging some documents (see *NT* Nos. 44/90 – Russ. ed. and 2/91).

In its indictment, the KGB tells the following story of Scholenberg's criminal activity. In the summer of 1989, the businessman had borrowed about nine million rubles to buy more than six tons of Siberian stag antlers in the Highland Altai. Scholenberg marketed the first batch of antlers with the help of Albert, a member of the Severnyie Panty state organization of Magadan. In 1989, the organization had a licence to sell the products of Tibetan medicine. The businessman made 2.1 million dollars which he deposited in his personal accounts in Austrian banks.

In 1990 the procedure of issuing licences changed. Investigators claim that at that time Scholenberg, with the help of an anonymous person and by means of a copying machine, forged a licence and other documents. Then he tried to smuggle about four tons of antlers through the Moscow regional customs office, but failed to do so.

In view of the gravity of the crimes committed (the theft of millions of dollars is punishable by death under Article 93.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) the court of law declined the request of the manager of the Wiedergeburt Bank commercial bank to release Scholenberg (the latter was a founder on that bank) on bail. According to the defendant, he could have brought from abroad evidence of his innocence if he could be released from prison for a while. For instance there is documented evidence to the effect that having deposited in Austrian banks the millions gained from the sale of the antlers, he did not try to conceal the money from the company. On the contrary, upon his return from Austria, he informed his colleagues of the deal. In the businessman's opinion, the dollars in foreign banks made it possible to settle accounts with partners and guaranteed credits. Besides, that was obviously a loophole, a means of avoiding the payment of rapacious interest charges to the Vneshekonombank of the USSR.

Looking for a "compromise"

The KGB busied itself with Scholenberg in earnest. Summoned to the court of law, Herr Welledits, Alfred's partner and Director of Austria's Salm O & Co., told an interesting story. According to him,

two men, calling themselves KGB agents, are touring Austria, collecting financial documents and talking with the Austrian businessmen Scholenberg has dealt with.

The manner in which the Austrian subject was "summoned" and questioned outraged the Austrian Embassy's official representative in the USSR, who voiced a protest. Between Austria and the USSR, there exists an understanding on legal assistance in the sphere of civil law only. However, in the opinion of the Embassy's representative, the Austrian side, at a request, could provide such assistance in a criminal case as well under the established international rules.

Says Judge Sergei Zaitsev: the official request filed with the Austrian side has been left unanswered. Therefore, it has been decided to expedite the provision of the necessary information. Was the Scholenberg case important enough for the Soviet Union to go to the length of a minor diplomatic scandal?

Incidentally, hasty investigation sometimes suffered serious setbacks. While acquainting himself with the evidence relevant to the case, attorney Roman Zlotin viewed a video recording (not erased by chance) of a private talk Nikolai Kuzmin, chief of the Novosibirsk KGB investigation department, had had with Scholenberg before an official questioning. During that talk, Kuzmin said that he would release Scholenberg from custody provided the latter pleaded guilty and repented sincerely. The counsel for the defence assessed this persuasion as a form of bringing pressure to bear on the person under investigation.

"Alfred," Kuzmin said in addition to the above, "had we reached a compromise, the case would have long been closed. And now I have to dig deeper, to summon new witnesses who will sling mud at you." What kind of a compromise was meant? What could enable the investigator to close the case?

Did he steal or didn't he?

The indictment was worded quite vaguely: the defendant misappropriated 2.1 million dollars through stealing 3.3 million rubles' worth of antlers of young Siberian stags, and he attempted to steal 4.2 million rubles' worth of antlers.

On the second day of the trial, Scholenberg demanded that someone explain to him what he was accused of: the theft of antlers, dollars, or rubles? At first, the court refused to make clear the essence of the case, but the defenders' repeated queries (Scholenberg is defended by Roman Zlotin and Igor Akhanov) compelled the judge and the people's assessors to "decode" the vague wording of the indictment and to admit that Scholenberg was tried on charges of stealing antlers, not hard currency. This forced admission made those present in the courtroom suspect that the investigators were deliberately misleading the public. After all, investigator Kuzmin of the KGB had incriminated Scholenberg in the stealing of dollars and persisted in that for a whole year.

After a few days of the trial, the counsel for the defence submitted to the court proof that Scholenberg having received 6.8 million rubles' worth of antlers from the Progress firm, made profit in hard currency and exchanged part of it, returning 8.2 million rubles to the firm by the time he was arrested. Didn't the investigator know that when he brought against the defendant charges which qualify for capital punishment?

It is up to the court to return the final verdict, of course, but already the accusations of stealing antlers made against Scholenberg look groundless. The defendant himself is certain that the case has been inspired by the KGB from the very beginning, that the trial is conducted tendentiously, that the court is trying to bring out and piece together bits of incriminating evidence instead of clarifying the circumstances which would prove him innocent.

Indeed, the court viewed, without much emotion, the video recording of the investigator hinting to the defendant that a "compromise" could be reached, ignoring Scholenberg's indignation at the tendentiousness of the trial and transferring the hearing of the case to Moscow where most of the witnesses in Scholenberg's case of contraband are found.

A wrong kind of licence

In Moscow, the businessman was held in the KGB's Lefortovo prison, taken to the courtroom by a Black Maria under escort of an officer, an armed squad, and a police dog. In court, he was locked in a cage, refused even a sip of water in 30 degrees Centigrade heat, and given lunch only in the late afternoon, back in the Lefortovo jail. Such treatment looks rather strange against the background of the recent trial of bribe-taking customs officers who were allowed to smoke and play chess in the courtroom, and who got their lunches on time. Investigation was conducted by the KGB, too.

The interrogation of witnesses from the customs office revealed unexpected details. It was established that Scholenberg had handed over to the customs officials a licence copy different from that filed by the investigators. The witnesses said that the document handed in by the businessman carried clear-cut impressions of seals, which were not to be found on the filed copy at all.

The filed licence copy is quite unlike the document received by Boris Klyucherev, the chief of the Tariff and Cargo Department of the Moscow Regional Customs Office. He said that the document had

This van took the defendant from Lefortovo jail to the courtroom

struck him as suspicious the moment he saw it. A check proved it to be a forgery. The customs officer testified that the document had been handed over to him, about two weeks before the arrest of a batch of antlers, by a stranger who allegedly represented Scholenberg. The latter said he had not instructed anyone to act on his behalf. The counsel for the defence is of the opinion that someone "tipped off" the customs that way. Who was that someone?

The court heard out with close attention the testimony of another witness, Nikolai Ramenskikh, also a customs officer, who said that the customs declaration produced by Scholenberg was made out incorrectly. However, a representative of the Chelek joint venture, authorized to issue customs declarations, maintained that he had made out the document for Scholenberg quite properly, in full keeping with customs regulations, while an official of the Izmailovsky customs office assured the court that he had handled the declaration himself and found it immaculate.

Again, the court reacted rathed coolly to the discrepancies in the accounts of witnesses. Neither the judge nor the people's assessors commented on their rulings. However, the language they use and the actions they take suggest that the trial is of an obviously accusatory nature.

For instance, the court obtained from the Moscow Regional Customs Office, on its own initiative, the Scholenberg smuggling case (the records of an investigation conducted by the customs office). The case contains a licence copy with seal impressions which are even less distinct than those on the above-mentioned filed copy. The defendant said that it was a copy of the filed document he had nothing to do with, and demanded its expert examination. The court turned down the demand without explaining its motives for doing so, although there is an unwritten rule by which all the requests made and versions given by a defendant facing trial on charges which mandate capital punishment are to be thoroughly studied in court.

The court ruled that an economic and legal examination be carried out to estimate the damage done to the state by the failure to pay into the state budget the interest received on the sale of antlers. The job was assigned to experts of the Vneshekonombank (the bank Scholenberg had failed to pay the interest to!). There is a law, however, that the court may order expert examination only when special knowledge in the spheres of science, technology, art or handicraft is required. In this particular case, the court ordered expert examination of a **legal** problem. The experts were to answer the question of "What legal acts have been violated?" The question contains an affirmation. But how about the presumption of innocence before a verdict is returned?

The case hearing in Moscow was completed on July 11, and the court went back to Novosibirsk. The counsel for the defence says that not a single charge made against the defendant has been proved so far...

* * *

What is Scholenberg being tried for? If he has evaded paying taxes to the Vneshekonombank, a fine should be levied on him, that's all. What has the Criminal Code to do with this? He is accused of smuggling but the Customs Code of the USSR no longer classifies getting goods into or out of the country on the basis of forged documents as smuggling. In accordance with a resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated July 1, 1991, if the laws of Union republics contradict the Customs Code, the latter should be abided by. It looks as if this provision does not apply to the Russian Federation...

There may be something else behind the "Scholenberg case." Scholenberg is deputy chairman of the All-Union Ethnic Germans' Society called Revival.

Last autumn Alfred Scholenberg, then an inmate of the Novosibirsk prison, wrote down the following account of how he had landed there: "Two men walked into my office and flashed their KGB cards at me. Our conversation lasted for over an hour. What they told me boiled down to the following: all foreigners are secret agents, most Soviet people are prepared to make criminal contacts with them, so I have to keep a close eye on them... In August, a KGB man unexpectedly made an appointment with me... and tried to talk me into cooperation. I refused point-blank. Then he said I was in for big trouble."

I have heard talk to the effect that our secret service is afraid lest the business companies now being set up by ethnic Germans with a view to reviving their culture (after all, they have only themselves to rely upon in this matter) should serve as inlets for a massive influx of German marks which will buy up the whole of Russia... Soviet ethnic Germans put the "Scholenberg case" in a class with other events: the first congress in the history of this ethnic group has been pronounced "unlawful," and someone has skilfully split the Revival movement... The more active and enterprising ethnic Germans seek to "hedge their bets" by dual citizenship. And those who do not feel like leaving for the West so far are losing interest in public affairs...

It goes without saying that the state security service should look after the interests of the state, and I am not inclined to underrate the danger of our country being sold out. But then, doesn't the exodus of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans, this "brain and work force drain," do terrible damage to our land?

Konstantin Isakov

Photos by the author

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

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

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

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FROM THE XXth CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Introduced by *New Times* analyst **Rostislav Zolotaryov**

Featured below are excerpts from an essay by Eduard Bernstein about the nature and politics of Russian Bolshevism. Anyone reading the writings of the German "revisionist" will certainly feel that the Marx carried over into Russia but little resembled his Rhine double.

It should be noted, incidentally, that Bernstein was no obedient disciple of the "founder." He resolutely called for a revision of some Marxist tenets which he believed to be outdated. Possibly such dissident views, his protest against vulgarized notions of Marxism that Social Democrats espoused in the belief that they would contribute to an early socialist revolution warranted his perception not only of Marxism's utopian aspect, but also of its treasures, kept Marx within the orbit of cultural and social tradition.

Bernstein maintains that any society will continue while it ensures the growth of the productive forces and the well-being of its members. He is against the Jacobinian aspects of Bolshevism and its pipe dream of a socialist society in a backward country. He is convinced that willful coercion by a handful of "professional revolutionaries" will never secure positive results. For that matter, should revolution be pure violence, a pogrom? Bernstein draws our eye to the dangers of a crudely vulgar identification of the concept of exploitation with the concept of surplus value, or of the thought that the entrepreneur is naught but a "thief." Indeed, the entrenchment of a hostile attitude towards capital, which degenerates into the scream: "Loot the looted!" inevitably results in violence, terror, and a totalitarian state. In Bernstein's view the state is above all an agency for compromise. "Everywhere where there is no well-ordered system of legal relationships," he writes, "where uncertainly prevails in the realm of law, where it is unknown today what laws will be valid tomorrow, ruin is bound to follow."

The saddled Marx

Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932)

In its entire socialist policy, that faction of Russian socialists who style themselves Bolsheviks is motivated by the imperative that to shape a new society, they must necessarily possess force. Otherwise, they assert, there is no alternative, inasmuch as every thought and aspiration should be focussed on the seizure of political power. Though this probably finds support in some passages of the Communist Manifesto, the Bolshevik party, which currently is the party of Russian Communists and so heads the Third, or Communist, International, previously called itself the Party of Maximalists. They overlook the circumstance that Marx's entire teaching is primarily evolutionary and that with the passage of time Marx himself evolutionized. Engels repeatedly admitted that at the outset he and Marx had been guilty of a grave error as concerns the process and rapidity of advance.

In their allusions to Marx the Bolsheviks frequently indulge in scholasticism – and here I believe it necessary to add that I see scholasticism as a mental trend, as brainwork which consists of hunting up for their preset theses or ideas deductive evidence via artificial interpretation, often stretching a point, with the inductive aspect, verification by factual evidence pushed far into the background if not totally ignored. Yet an essential quality of the teaching of social evolution that Marx and Engels developed is precisely its stress on a close – one may even say organic – link between socio-political factors and actual economic development. Proceeding therefrom the fathers of the Communist Manifesto, however revolutionary their thinking may have been for that time and to whatever extent they may have sided with the Communist ideas espoused by the vanguard of the current working class movement, nevertheless theoretically opposed the radical socialists of the time who, though considered revolutionary communists, could actually claim only to be "pipe dreamers of the socialist revolution."

The Bolshevist doctrine either flouts or circumvents all that. It either relies on the Communist Manifesto, with its lapidary sharp statements of the early period of Marx and Engels, by which they sought to "epater le bourgeois"; or extrapolate Marx's later-day pronouncements and impart the crudest and clumsiest of interpretations. Thus in the penultimate chapter of the first volume of his *Capital* when, characterizing the historical tendencies of capitalist accumulation, Marx says: "Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labour at last reach a point where they became incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated." Consequently, when development itself becomes incompatible with the capitalist integument, the expropriators, as Marx terms the capitalists, are themselves expropriated in the process of cutthroat competition by which bigger capitalists expropriate the smaller capitalists. From this tenet presenting the known historical perspective, the Bolsheviks arrived at their motto of "Loot the looted!" The working classes understood this literally and often resorted to the harshest of measures to effect it. Entrepreneurs are represented not as economic expropriators, but as moral embezzlers or simply thieves.

In every respect, let me say, the Bolshevik doctrine has imparted to Marxism a far more coarse, indeed, barbaric, character. Historically, until a certain peak of economic development is reached the entrepreneur's functions as the motive force of production are disregarded in spite of Marx who in the third volume of his *Capital*, with which it is true only few are familiar, demonstrates that capital, which he so categorically assails in other respects, discharges in the process of social development important functions conductive to progress – civilizing functions as he defines them. Bolshevism calmly ignores all this as well as the conclusions ensuing therefrom for economic policy, recognizing only force as the all-powerful

creative motive. In the writings of leading Bolsheviks, not so much Lenin as Bukharin, Zinoviev and others, one will discover passages, which increasingly categorically ascribe to force a well-nigh wonder-working capacity as a panacea. All that is necessary, they aver, is to possess force, which will enable one to direct development at his discretion.

Note that in 1859, Marx says in his foreword to "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy", that no social formation will end until developed are all the productive forces for which it affords adequate room, and new higher relations of production will never emerge until the necessary material conditions ripen within the old society. So quoth Marx. Let us now refer to Bukharin's booklet *The Communist (Bolshevik) Programme*. In it without any further beating around the bush, as regards current affairs, he preaches socialist revolution via the dictatorship of the working class in Russia, which generally speaking, is as yet an underdeveloped country, and he accompanies this with the remark that, "the dictatorship of the working class implies the power of the working class, that throttles the bourgeoisie and landed gentry."

In society, where uncertainty prevails in the realm of law and it is not known today what laws will be valid tomorrow, ruin is bound to follow

This, mind you, is said of the country that had no bourgeois state at all as we well know! He says further that this dictatorship should be one of "iron," a term which both in this booklet and throughout Bolshevik literature is echoed time and time again, moreover construed as the crassest ruthlessness. Thus a few pages further we read: "During revolution there can be no freedom for enemies of the people and revolution."

Represented as enemies of the people, though, are not only all bourgeois parties withour discrimiation, but likewise such socialists as the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries adhering to views other than those of the Bolsheviks. That is the extreme sort of terrorism one can imagine. The brochure *Soviet Power and International Imperialism*, which sets out the report that Leo Trotsky addressed to unprepared workers, states, that power is an instrument by means of which the class in question consolidates its dominion. This instrument either serves the working class or goes against it. Thereby expunged from the life of the people is every kind of development from one social system to its opposite: there are no periods of transition or development but only revolution accomplished by force. In the same vein Trotsky speaks further about the exercise of political power by the Bolsheviks. He employs the following argument to justify their failures: to learn to govern the country, authority must be taken in hand and possession must be gained of state power. Nobody yet has learned to ride a horse while locked in a room. To learn how to do that, one must saddle the horse and mount it. It is quite possible that the horse will rear and throw off the rider again and again. We shall get up, saddle the horse and ride again, and thus learn how to do it.

Were such experiments to refer only to persons who want to learn to ride, for which read "govern," one could call that this is excellent. But the shoe is on a totally different foot when an entire state is subjected to coerced economic experiments, implying that perhaps this might not occur, in which case we shall repeat the process, when a vast nation is treated thus, quite likely hundreds of thousands will be doomed to hunger, poverty, and death.

Bolshevism thinks that volition in history is well-nigh unlimited. Therein is the fateful fallacy of the policy the Bolsheviks pursue, the fact that they conduct themselves as if there were no limit to the volition of the revolutionary reformer. The guidelines of their undertakings are far more reminiscent of initial tsarism than Marxism, as with regard to Marxism they are but caricatures. After all, the salient feature of the creative writings of Marx and Engels is precisely that their teaching is scientifically grounded with respect to the limitations the history of human society imposes upon volition.

The Bolsheviks have learned that from their own bitter experience. This is something they can no longer deny, that wherever their coercive measures failed to reckon with the economic setup, they sustained the most contemptible failures. Sad to say, the Russian nation has had to pay with untold sacrifice for this experiment.

From the dictatorship of the proletariat, which, scarcely exists formally, they have switched to the proletariat's de facto enslavement, while from the "throttling" of capitalist entrepreneurs, as Bukharin put it, they have entrenched vast bureaucracy that will hardly be found in the administration or industry of any other country. Russia's misfortunes increase endlessly and the suppression of political freedom continues. Not a single socialist newspaper of any other trend is permitted: bourgeois newspapers cannot be published at all: only Bolshevik media are allowed. Free creative vigour in the economic field, which for Russia is absolutely essential should it desire to at least get back on its feet, has been killed.

Everywhere where there is no well-ordered system of legal relationships, where uncertainty prevails in the realm of law, where it is unknown today what laws will be valid tomorrow, ruin is bound to follow. Such, sad to say, is the picture we observe in Russia today.

Compiled by
Nikolai Omelchenko

■

With her two-year internship as the stage director of the Bolshoi Theatre coming to an end, **Olga Ivanova** "defended her thesis" by achieving the creation of the Northern Lights centre in Moscow.

"It's the most important production of my life," she said with a smile.

Northern Lights is the cultural and trade centre that is supposed to breathe new strength into the not-so-happy lives of the so-called "little people": the indigenous peoples of the northern and far eastern regions of the USSR.

Olga remembers well a cramped, dirty yaranga (tent), with a smoky fireplace in the centre over which hung a swinging vat full of some kind of soup. That childhood memory pushed her toward the idea of creating such a centre, which is now legally taking shape. The next step is planning the construction of the complex, which must be big enough for auditoriums for business meetings, congresses exhibitions, concerts, and theatrical productions. Ivanova, you see, is a graduate of the State Institute of Dramatic Art (GITIS).

Her first attempt to study at the institute was unsuccessful. The verdict of the great Yuri Zavadsky: get more experience before you apply again. Ivanova returned to Yakutsk, and qualified for a TV announcer position, and for more than ten years appeared on TV screens. Obviously, she counted that her experience was enough to be accepted into the correspondence section of GITIS. After graduating, she worked in the Yakutsk state musical theatre. But she really wanted to know what it would be like to work for a large theatrical group. All roads led to the Bolshoi, and to the position of stage director which she has held for two years.

The opening of Northern Lights has already taken place. An expedition was send to Chukot Peninsula and Kamchatka to gather data on the present-day indigenous peoples. There is an agreement about an allotment of land for the building of a centre in the Tushinsky district of Moscow. The first sponsors have been found. They have gotten in touch with Canadian and American Indian, Inuit, and Eskimo organizations...

* * *

51-year-old **Bernard Kouchner**, the state secretary for humanitarian action under the prime minister of France, believes that in the arena of international politics the opportunity to intervene in the affairs of other states has finally surfaced. "We will continue to respect states' sovereignty, but will no longer be indifferent to the suffering of people inside of countries," he says.

Kouchner put no small effort into seeing that France took part in the war in Iraq as a member of the coalition. The state secretary spends all of his time jetting from one hot place to another. In France he has become a symbol of the fight for human rights.

Kouchner holds his doctorate in medicine, and studied at the Sorbonne. He was one of the founders of the group Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders). These young doctors rendered assistance to the population of Afghanistan, Chile, El Salvador, Ethiopia, and Cambodia, frequently even without the permission of the governments of these countries. In 1979, Kouchner was forced to leave the organization – he ignored MSF rules to speak to the press only anonymously. Soon, he was again much spoken about after founding the organization Médecins du Monde (Doctors of the World).

After the Socialists' victory at the polls, Kouchner had his chance to prove himself in politics: he was offered the post of special secretary in the Social Affairs and Employment Ministry. In 1988, the Prime Minister of France, Michel Rocard, made him first a special advisor and then state secretary for humanitarian action.

Many French citizens

The Keeper of the *New Times*

The oldest *New Times* employee, **Boris Kravets**, has reached his 70-year mark. Forty four years ago he began his first and what would become the only job in his life, in the reference section of the magazine, and 25 years ago he became the head of it. The work in that section of *NT* is akin to mine clearing: there were always enough skilled craftsmen to put into their articles, reporting, and interviews mines in the form of partially confirmed facts and figures from someone's "memory." On this anniversary, the rest of the editorial staff tried to count how many troubles, disasters, scandals, dismissals, and simple reprimands Kravets had saved them from. They couldn't do it. Also, how many presently highly respected journalists came to work for *NT* under his guidance?

Kravets conducts the neverending process of extracting potentially explosive mistakes not only with supreme skill but also with the greatest patience and tact. Kravets' expansive knowledge helps.

He began his education at the Institute of History, Philosophy and Literature (IFLI) but was not able to finish it – the war interfered with his plans. On his burthday, July 11, 1941, Kravets volunteered for service in the untitank battalion of the Sokolniki district of Moscow. In October of 1941, several of these battalions were consolidated to form the Moscow Fifth Rifle Division, whose mission was the defense of the nearest approaches to Moscow. In February the division was sent to the Kalininsky front and was immediately thrown on the offensive. Kravets didn't make it into the attacked village on February 28: a serious head wound from an exploding mine prevented him. At the field hospital the orderlies laid Kravets in the corridor, considering his condition hopeless. Luckily for him the military surgeon Vitkin arrived at the hospital that very day... After that were other operations, the last of which was done by the great-grandson of Andrei Arendt, a physician in ordinary of Nicholas the First.

After leaving the hospital, Kravets continued his studies at the Moscow State University and in 1946 he graduated with honors from the history department. From 1947 to this day, the generations of *NT* employees do not cease to admire the faith in the magazine, selflessness, and sense of humor of Boris Kravets.

doubt the lawfulness of the very existence of his post, reasoning that the French government doesn't have the right to send troops into areas of conflict, reserving that right for the UN only, and leaving humanitarian aid to the International Red Cross. However, even the sworn enemies of Kouchner say that he does far more good than bad.

K.Shukhnov

* * *

Anissa Ayala, a 19-year-old Californian with leukemia, has just received a bone marrow transplant. The donor: her 14-month-old baby sister, Marissa.

Her case received wide publicity, and now Americans are arguing over whether or not it is ethical to give birth to a child solely for the purpose of getting a donor for its siblings, parents, or close relatives.

Four years ago, when doctors determined that Anissa had a form of leukemia which in 80 to 90 percent of the cases is fatal, the girl's parents and doctors began the search for a bone marrow donor who could match Anissa's. But they couldn't find one. Her parents' bone marrow didn't match hers either. It was then that they decided to have another child – maybe it would be a suitable donor.

After that operation took place it came to light that at least 40 children have been born in America in the last five years solely to become bone marrow donors. Although the procedure is completely risk-free for these children, such a system is repulsive to many people. Even more condemn the parents who have children solely as donors for their loved ones. Specialists in the area of ethics consider that having children for this purpose breaks one of the basic principles of human morality – that is, one should bear children solely for the purpose of giving them life and to love them, and that children, as people, have a right to that. Any selfish motives are considered immoral. Others claim that a child born specifically to save the life of a loved one will be loved even more, and that it is absolutely pointless to criticize the parents who chose this course of action.

* * *

A Russian language teacher in South Africa

The course of life of charming **Elena Novak**, the senior teacher of the Russian language and literature at the University of South Africa in Pretoria, lies through many countries. Her parents lived in Armenia until the 1920s, and then moved to Poland. That is where Elena was born, educated, and married... In the late 1960s the Novak family left Poland and settled in France. South African employment agents were looking for young specialists, and offered Elena and her husband work in South Africa.

"We arrived in South Africa with empty suitcases," Novak told us, "but after three days of residence on South African soil, we already had a house, work, and money... Soon I abandoned my former profession – engineering – and began to teach Russian at one of the Johannesburg universities."

The gifted teacher attracted much attention, and soon was asked to head a chair of the University of South Africa in Pretoria.

This correspondence college is one of the largest in the world and definitely in Africa. More than 100,000 students from all over the world are educated here. More than 50 percent of them are young blacks. The department of the Russian language and literature has 90 students, all of whom are whites.

"There is no discrimination here based on skin colour," says Novak. "I, by the way, have always been actively against apartheid. The point is simply that black South Africans, although in a roundabout way, always have been able to study in the USSR, while white South Africans never had the chance."

Today Elena Novak is writing her doctorate dissertation in comparative linguistics. She teaches courses for anyone who wants to study Russian, lectures at many universities, and writes articles for the local papers. She is so popular in South Africa that people consult her on any question that has to do with the Soviet Union and sometimes even phone her to find out some obscure word having to do with Soviet subjects for a crossword puzzle...

This summer Novak, a guest of our editorial staff, brought her favourite pupils to the Soviet Union – eleven of them, as if they were a soccer team. The young South Africans live with families, attend class with teachers from the Patrice Lumumba People's Friendship University, and meet with their Soviet peers. It is the first time in history that there has been summer school for South Africans in Moscow, which would be more correctly called "winter school" in the South African way, as it's winter now in South Africa.

Ya.Borovoi

44-year-old American actress **Susan Saradon** has never been attracted by the roles portraying women of easy virtue, the roles she has nevertheless played for over 15 years. "For a long time, I have been thinking wouldn't it be interesting to figure out why it is that when women take off their clothes they seem to lose their personalities?" says the actress, although she earned no small fame for doing just that.

Two years ago *Playboy* named her the woman with the "Celebrity Breasts of the Summer," while *Savvy* called her the "Thinking Man's Sex Symbol." The latter is no mere coincidence – Saradon has always tried to create that image on the screen. "It is not then possible to be a smart sexy woman?" she asks. "Do you really have to be the ice queen intellectual or the slut whore? Isn't there some way to be both?" She tries to incorporate this concept into her latest film, *Thelma and Louise*, which recently came out in the States.

Saradon graduated from Catholic University in Washington, D.C. Divorced, she has two children. In 1981 she was one of the contenders for the title of Best Actress, which she conceded to a more fortunate rival.

* * *

Alive and kicking

The 17th Moscow Film Festival works!

Neya Zorkaya

On July 8, the opening day of the 17th Moscow Film Festival, the grounds of the Rossiya Hotel were seething with jubilant crowds. Occasionally, a shock of jet-black hair over an aquiline profile popped up for a few seconds, only to drown again. The crowd left behind it a path strewn with rose petals. Thus the Moscow fans of the Indian film star Amitabh Bachchan greeted their idol – neither Jean Marais nor Alberto Sordi was such a big hit...

"We are not licked yet," I thought. After all, it is common knowledge that our film festival is "having problems." This has become all but an "idee fixe." The phrase sets my teeth on edge and has turned into a meaningless cliche (as if we lived in a "golden age" before perestroika, as if, at the height of "stagnation," people didn't wise-crack to the effect that "temporary difficulties were the only permanent factor of Soviet life").

Everything is accessible. Alas...

The cinema and film festivals are not experiencing the best of times, indeed. Popular interest in cinema art has waned, the theatres are half empty, Soviet movies – as well as the intrusive American ones – draw practically no audiences. Incidentally, other "cinema powers" of the world have long gone through and, perhaps, overcome this crisis. So what is to be done about it? The family of the audiovisual facilities has grown, its junior members – the TV-set and the VCR – have "stolen the show." There are many other causes of the cinema crisis. For the first time in its 32-year history, the Moscow International Film Festival has not drawn full houses. Tickets to any Festival centre – the Cinema House and even to the Rossiya concert hall, the site of delegation presentations, competitions, and the best out-of-competition picture shows ("Panorama") – were readily available. Social and artistic life is governed by specific laws still to be studied and taken into account.

Our movie makers clashed over the issue of whether to hold film festivals at all. "You don't hold festivals in a country where vodka is rationed and where you have to queue up for any food," some argued, and were right in their own way. "This amounts to a surrender, to forfeiting the reputation of a Group A (top-class) film festival venue," others insisted. The latter prevailed, with the support of Moscow, the Moscow Soviet, and a "new class" of sponsors, namely the Russian commodity and raw materials exchange (the general sponsor), Aeroflot, the Hyundai Electronics company (Seoul), New York's famous *Variety* weekly, and others, God bless them. They did not merely subsidize the Festival, but rendered it loving moral support, so to say.

As a veteran observer and chronicler of Moscow Film Festivals, I testify that there has never been a more impressive opening ceremony than the latest one, with a golden trainful of film stars rolling onto the Rossiya concert hall's stage in what was a scene reminiscent of Lumière's first movie (1895). The treats served at the traditional reception, held on the occasion in the Prague restaurant, were also tastier, more generous – and more aesthetically appealing – than ever. That may have looked cynical against the background of our empty store shelves – but why not regard it as a prototype of our coming abundance?

None of our complaints and our whimpering! We are prone to extremes: now we boast to the whole world about our successes, now we humiliate ourselves to the extent of alienating many people from Moscow. After all, it takes a certain amount of courage to go to "a city of nightmares" for a "comatose festival" (as we described it ourselves). Indeed, some of those invited seemed to have changed their minds at the eleventh hour. They may yet be sorry about that.

Those conspicuously absent from the Festival included the famous Madonna who had made her arrival conditional upon a meeting with President Gorbachev, no less. This brings to mind the stars of old, such as Gina Lollobrigida, a dazzling beauty and a talented actress, who was happy to meet Yuri Gagarin and flattered by the presence of "Signor Khrushchev himself" at the opening ceremony of the Second Moscow Film Festival.



Sons of a bitch **by Leonid Filatov was shown on the first night of the festival: paying homage to the acting fraternity**

Photos by Evgeny Kondakov

The Marchioness of Angels and Madame Bovary

At the current Moscow Film Festival, the emphasis was on the movie actor and actress, a profession as difficult, if not heroic, as it is usually overshadowed at festivals by that of the film director. The Russian actor Oleg Yankovsky, the chairman of the jury, has just added to the long list of his brilliant achievements the role of Emperor Nicholas II in *Regicide*. The jury included Michèle Mercier, the French star famous in the USSR for her unforgettable Angélique (*Marchioness of Angels*, etc.) and the Korean starlet Kang Soo-Yeon, the last Festival's Best Actress award winner. The film directors' "fraternity" was also well represented in the jury which featured such celebrities as Marta Meszaros (Hungary), Dusan Makavejev (Yugoslavia), and Manuel Gutierrez Aragon (Spain). Their pictures were repeatedly shown at past festivals and drew full houses at Soviet cinemas.

Movie stars ought to figure prominently in the Festival orbit. Only a few of them were present here "in the flesh" however: besides the above-mentioned Indian favourite, Bachchan, the "constellation" comprised a charming and exquisitely modest Isabelle Huppert, who plays the lead in the French screen adaptation of Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*; Jan Nowicki, the Polish superstar; Nicole Ansari and Oliver Broumis, the talented young couple starring in the interesting Swiss film *From Here to Eternity*, a modern "computerized" version of the ancient myth about Orpheus and Eurydice. But then the festival screen is studded with first-class luminaries!

Entered in the competition were films featuring Max von Sydow, the famous Swede, Ingmar Bergman's choice for the leads in his early *The Seventh Seal* and *La source*, who puts in a brilliant performance in the Australian picture *The Father* (one of the best films on the 17th Moscow Festival's programme, I think); Marcello Mastroianni, our all-time favourite, who plays the role of Professor Bruschi in the Italian film *Towards Evening* – a meaningful title; we see the evening of a life and the twilight of the century, the decline of the faith this man has had in Marxist ideas an postulates.

Omar Sharif appeared in the Egyptian film called *The Egyptian*. Gene Hackman, the American who has made himself famous by his performance in *The French Connection*, now plays a progressive lawyer in the US film called *Class Action*.

As far as non-competition films are concerned, I should like to single out Wojciech Pszoniak's noble and humane perfomance as Janusz Korczak in Andrzej Wajda's film of the same name; John Malkovich appears in Bernardo Bertolucci's *The Sheltering Sky*, a new masterpiece by the Italian film director of genius. A retrospective series of films starring Gérard Depardieu was on at the Mir, the French movie theatre on Moscow's Tsvetnoi Boulevard.

No paper... A film lost...

Even thematically, the 17th Moscow Film Festival paid tribute to the acting fraternity. Only two countries, the USA and the USSR, have entered in the competition two films each (compared with the other contestants' one film apiece), of which *The Doors* by Oliver Stone and *Sons of a Bitch* by Leonid Filatov initiate the spectator into the very special, charming and strange backstage world full of drama and passions. Both films were to have been shown on the first night, right after the opening ceremony (oh, those good intentions!) but the American film got lost somewhere on the way – incidents like that are by no means uncommon here. It was only on Sunday, the 14th of July, that we had a chance to see the film about Jim Morrison, the legendary singer, the poet, the leader of the Doors rock group, an extraordinary and tragic personality.

Was that the only setback? Of course it wasn't. The guests were in for many disappointments, more than on any previous occasion. There was no PROC – professional club of moviemakers which had been so popular at the 1987 Festival. Information was scanty, to the guests' righteous indignation. Our thin *Courier* magazine, composed in microscopic print, was a pitiful sight next to the glossy and colourful booklets and posters from any other country, be it South Korea or Switzerland. Even the veteran *Film Festival Sputnik*, once large and gaudy, kept diminishing in size and bulk from year to year to become a tabloid by the previous Festival and to breathe its last by now. No paper! Large tracts of woodland have been chopped down, and the once pure water of Lake Baikal polluted in vain... Now we can only pin our hopes on the trees that will grow in place of the felled ones. There is always hope. "A new day is breaking, a new epoch is coming," as Herzen once said after another Russian spiritual crisis. This light of hope may not yet have been discerned "by the arrogant foreigner," to quote the poet Tyutchev. Nevertheless, it does illuminate, softly but steadily, today's Film Festival – and the Festival, like the cinema art in general, is always a mirror of society.

There are many changes for the better, and many good old traditions are kept alive. A whole Youth Palace has been handed over to the FECIM – the Federation of Cinema Clubs. The latter had an international jury of their own which included Bernard Durou, a French enthusiast of the Soviet cinema, they conducted their own opinion polls and arranged discussions of creative problems involved in moviemaking. I'd refer to their members as the elite section of the cinema-going public, without quotation marks.

The Film Centre in Druzhinnikovskaya has been completely given over to the young Soviet avant garde moviemakers. From morning till night, new films – some of them fresh from the darkroom and barely edited – were shown in its three halls. Between film shows, get-togethers and press conferences were held, many of a nature previously unthinkable.

For instance, the young Christian Cinema Association under the USSR Cinematographers' Union (President: Latavra Dularidze, a critic) showed its thought-provoking documentaries for the greater part of a day. The show naturally developed into a round-table discussion on the subject of "The cinema and the church" which, to put it mildly, had not been much of a topic for discussion in our aggressively atheistic society of old. Taking part in that emotional discussion were moviemakers, Father Vladislav Sveshnikov, archpriest of the Russian Orthodox Church, members of the international oecumenical jury which worked at the Moscow Film Festival for the second time: Ambrose Eichenberger, a prominent European moviemaker and film critic; Mr. Henk Hoekstra, President of the International Catholic Film Organization from Holland; Cornelius Majlink, a representative of the International Protestant Association (also Holland); Deacon Vsevolod Chaplin; and Vera Ivanova, a film critic of the *Ekran* magazine, representing the above-mentioned Christian Cinema Association.

The Soviet film programmes in Druzhinnikovskaya attracted foreign critics' attention. They were sensational, often defiantly so. While draft Treaties of Union are being endlessly discussed in the upper echelons, a creative "Treaty of Union" has been privately and peacefully signed at the Film Centre where moviemakers of Georgia, Lithuania, Turkmenia, and Tadjikistan have shown their efforts.

Overcoming the Little Brother complex



"Abolishing the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the USSR Cabinet of Ministers would be conducive to signing the Treaty of Union," says 35-year-old Muratbek Imanaliyev, Kirghiz Foreign Minister, now an aide to the President, Academician Askar Akayev

I first met Muratbek Imanaliyev in Teheran at the ceremony dedicated to the second anniversary of imam Homeini's death. Our hosts filled in numerous forms for us and, answering the question about religion, Imanaliyev said that by origin he had a certain relationship to Islam.

New Times. Are you a believer?

Muratbek Imanaliyev. I mean that Kirghiz people historically are Muslims, and in a way I, too, have a relationship to Islam. As regards myself, I can hardly claim to be a Muslim: I know neither the Koran nor Sharia and do not follow them.

NT. Has anything changed in the foreign ministry of Kyrghyzstan over the years of perestroika?

M.I. When I first came there nothing signified that it was a ministry of foreign affairs, except, possibly, the plate at the entrance. But the years 1987-88 and especially 1989 saw a number of radical changes in the political activity of the ministry. Independent regional diplomacy is a major attainment of the republics.

NT. What do you mean by "regional diplomacy"?

M.I. What I mean is cooperation of the republics with their neighbours abroad. In our case they are China, Afghanistan, India and, to some extent, Turkey. We are elaborating a foreign policy concept of the republic. Among other things, it will cover the issues of human rights, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Our ministry prepared an intergovernmental protocol between Kyrghyzstan and Turkey which was signed during our prime minister's visit to Ankara.

NT. Your republic has voted for the Union. At the same time, you say that the Kirghiz people should become part of the whole world community...

M.I. I think this is a dual task. In a way it is also related to what we call a "renewed union of republics." Practically it could be implemented in the following way. In foreign affairs, Kyrghyzstan would represent not only the republic proper, but also the union as a whole in matters agreed upon with the centre. Of course, this is a far-away perspective, for there is no mechanism for cooperation with republican ministries so far, in our case it is within the framework of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

NT. Negotiations with other countries should also include emigration issues. Your republic has a German community which is gradually leaving for Germany. What is your attitude towards this?

M.T. It is true that the majority of emigrants are Soviet Germans. I must admit that in former times their rights were infringed upon, be it job promotion, education, or another area. Germans are leaving for a country where the situation is stable and life is better.

NT. How many of them have already left?

M.I. In 1987 we had about 110,000 Germans. Ten to twelve thousand have left since then. Another 25,000 have filed applications...

NT. Another serious topic is the situation on the border with Uzbekistan...

M.I. My point of view is as follows. The Uzbeks and Kirghizs are kindred nations. The main cause of the conflict is not interethnic relations, but the economic situation strained by the former leaders of the republic as a result of wrong decisions on personnel matters and some issues of economic development in the Osh region.

NT. Sorry, but you are too diplomatic now: "wrong decisions" – does that mean that the Uzbeks were not allowed to occupy certain posts? Or they were deprived of land? Or water?

M.I. It is not only that... The Uzbeks total about 35 to 40 percent of the population of the Osh region, but their number in the former leadership of the republic was practically nil.

NT. Formerly, the "national personnel" potential was often built up at the expense of other nations. It is evident that this "personnel" should not be trained at someone's expense...

M.I. I should say that the former system of training and promotion can hardly be explained logically. For instance, I can't say why secretaries on ideology in regional party committees were always women. Or why should a deputy of any leader or head belong to another nationality than his boss. I think that professional considerations should be the only reason for that. Competence alone should be the prime motive.

NT. And how do you cope with this problem in your ministry?

M.I. Now we have 21 persons on the staff, representatives of various nationalities. Generally, I select the staff according to education and skill. But top-notch specialists are still wanted.

Vladimir Zhitomirsky
for New Times

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

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